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Abstract
We develop a quantitative theory of repeated political transitions driven by revolts
and reforms. In the model, the beliefs of disenfranchised citizens play a key role
in determining revolutionary pressure, which in interaction with preemptive reforms
determines regime dynamics. We estimate the model structurally, targeting key moments
of the data. The estimated model generates a process of political transitions that looks
remarkably close to the data, replicating the empirical shape of transition hazards, the
frequency of revolts relative to reforms, the distribution of newly established regime types
after revolts and reforms, and the unconditional distribution over regime types. Using
the estimated model, we also explore circumstances of successful democratization, finding
that the sentiment of political outsiders is key for creating a window of opportunity,
whereas the scope of the initial democratic reform is key for the survival of young
democracies.
Keywords: Democratic reforms, regime dynamics, revolts, structural estimation, tran-
sition hazards.
JEL Classification: D74, D78, P16.
1 Introduction
This paper develops a quantitative theory of political transitions based on the evolution of
beliefs regarding the regime’s strength. Traditionally, the literature has focused on explaining
specific patterns of regime changes, focusing on isolated transition episodes. In this paper, we
shift the focus to a macro perspective, aiming to account for a number of stylized facts in a
unified framework.
Specifically, Section 2 of this paper documents five empirical regularities, which motivate
the theoretical framework.
1. The evolution of political systems is shaped by both revolts and democratic reforms,
with revolts being about three times as likely as reforms. Other modes of transition are
secondary.
2. Transition hazards are declining in regime maturity. Newly established regimes are
about three times as likely to be overthrown by a revolt and about six times as likely to
implement a democratic reform compared to regimes older than 10 years.
3. Transition hazards are inverse “J-shaped” in the inclusiveness of political systems:
Political systems at the extremes of the autocracy-democracy spectrum have smaller
transition hazards than regimes near the center of the spectrum; full-scale democracies
are overall most stable.
4. Revolts establish autocratic regimes; reforms establish democracies. Political systems
near the center of the autocracy-democracy spectrum are unlikely to arise from either
mode of transition.
5. The distribution of regime types is bi-modal, with mass concentrated towards the
extremes of the autocracy-democracy spectrum.
This paper puts forward a theory of political transitions, which accounts for all five stylized
facts above. In the model, the inclusiveness of a political system is defined by the fraction of
the population with access to political power (“political insiders”). Transitions are governed
by three main ingredients. First, reforms are rationalized by a preemptive logic as in the
seminal works by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), Conley and Temini (2001), and Boix
(2003). Second, revolts are the outcome of a coordination game among the disenfranchised
(“political outsiders”), introducing an intensive margin to revolting, defined by the degree
of equilibrium coordination among outsiders. Finally, the degree of coordination is shaped
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by the beliefs of outsiders regarding the regime’s strength, which is privately observed by
insiders at the beginning of each period.
In combination, the intensive margin of revolting and learning imply that revolt hazards
are decreasing in the regime’s strength as perceived by outsiders. This link between outsiders’
beliefs and revolt hazards is at the heart of our predictions. In particular, because in
equilibrium concessions are associated with being weak, the link implies that small reforms
will generally backfire and increase revolutionary pressure. Accordingly, when facing moderate
threats, insiders rather take “tough stance” than preempting a subversive threat, explaining
the prevalence of revolts documented in the data. Similarly, because transitions are more
likely to occur when a regime is weak, outsiders rationally become more and more convinced
that a regime is invulnerable as it matures, explaining the decline of transition hazards in
regime maturity. The logic behind the inverse J-shape of transition hazards is a combination
of two factors: On the one hand, full-scale democracies are intrinsically strong due to a lack
of opposition (the extensive margin of revolting). On the other hand, similar to mature
regimes, the most repressive autocracies are stable due to a low degree of coordination among
outsiders (the intensive margin of revolting). This is because such regimes arise precisely
from revolts that ex ante were considered as futile by outsiders, making them also less prone
to future unrest. Finally, the two remaining regularities are again a consequence of small
reforms backfiring and that revolts cannot grow too large as they would have been preempted
otherwise.
The model is rich enough to lend itself to a quantitative exploration, mainly due to two
modeling choices. First, transitions take place in a continuous polity space. This stands in
contrast to the previous literature, which typically considers transitions between two or three
exogenously defined political systems. Second, there are no exogenously absorbing states in
our model, allowing us to compare model moments (computed at the stationary distribution)
with their empirical counterparts. We demonstrate the quantitative potential through a
structural estimation of our model. The model matches the data remarkably well. It is not
only able to account for the above-listed regularities, but also quantitatively replicates the
shape of transition hazards, conditional outcome distributions, and the stationary distribution
of regime types.
We also use the estimated model to study circumstances under which successful democrati-
zation is likely. In the model, the belief or “sentiment” of outsiders is instrumental for creating
a window of opportunity, in which democratization is possible. Only if outsiders perceive the
regime as sufficiently vulnerable, they are likely to coordinate on large revolts and regimes are
inclined to implement reforms to preempt them. However, due to the presence of asymmetric
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information, regimes generally do not find it optimal to completely preempt a given threat of
revolt. As a result, episodes in which democratization is possible are also marked by high revolt
hazards, and the political system emerging from such “critical junctures” is determined by
chance and random variations in the state of the world. Moreover, because newly established
democracies emerge precisely when the regime is revealed to be most vulnerable, they are
highly susceptible to counter-revolts by a small but highly coordinated group of outsiders.
The model thus suggests that successful democratization critically hinges on the extent of the
initial push for democratization. While reforms that enfranchise between 75% and 85% of the
population have a cumulative failure rate of over 80 percent after 25 periods, the failure rate
drops to 12 percent if reforms initially enfranchise more than 95% of the population.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a list
of empirical regularities that are the target for our theoretical model. The model itself is
developed in Section 3. In Section 4, we estimate the model to demonstrate its ability to
quantitatively match the data. In Section 5, we provide intuition for how the different features
of the model contribute to its ability to account for the empirical regularities. In Section 6,
we study the model’s implications for the formation and survival of democracies. In Section 7,
we relate the model’s mechanism as well as its predictions to the existing literature. Section 8
concludes.
2 Evidence on Political Transitions
This section presents a list of stylized facts about political dynamics, which motivates the
theoretical framework developed in the next sections.
The presented regularities are based on the universe of political regimes existing between
1946 and 2010, combining information from three distinct datasets. First, we obtain the
universe of regime spells from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), who define regimes based
on the identity of the ruling groups. Second, we use the Polity IV Project’s polity index
(Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017) to assign a regime type to each regime spell, which ranks
political regimes on a 21-point scale between autocratic and democratic (normalized to values
between 0 and 1). Finally, we treat any substantial change in the composition of regime
insiders, as indicated by the turnover dates of regime spells, as transition events. Whenever
available, we use the classification provided by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) to classify
transition events. Otherwise, we match transitions to leader changes collected by the Archigos
Database of Political Leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009) and classify them
according to the nature of the observed leader change. The resulting database covers 485
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Table 1: Frequency of Transition Events
Transition event Frequency Share Yearly hazard
Revolt 188 0.56 0.0213
Democratic reform 66 0.20 0.0075
Autocratic consolidation 19 0.06 0.0021
Foreign imposition 16 0.05 0.0018
Other/unknown 49 0.14 0.0055
Total 338 1.00 0.0382
Notes.—The table reports number of occurrences for each transition type for all regime
changes between 1946 and 2010, as well as frequencies normalized by total transitions
(shares) and by country-years (yearly hazards).
regime spells and 329 transitions in 155 countries. Appendix A.1 describes the construction
of the dataset in detail.
Fact 1: The most frequent modes of transition are revolts and democratic reforms, with
revolts being about three times as likely as reforms.
Our definition of revolts encompasses all forms of coercive takeovers by domestic actors
(popular uprisings, power struggles between competing factions, and coups1). Democratic
reforms are peaceful transitions that lead to a more democratic political system. Together,
revolts and reforms constitute 75 percent of all observed transition events. This corresponds
to about .021 revolts and .008 reforms per country-year. The remaining transitions occur
either via autocratic consolidations (peaceful transitions towards more autocratic polities, six
percent), foreign imposition (five percent), or cannot be categorized based on the available
information (14 percent). See Table 1 for further details.
Fact 2: Transition hazards are declining in regime maturity.
Figure 1 plots the transition hazards for our data.2 Newly established regimes are about
three times as likely to be overthrown via revolt compared to regimes older than 10 years,
and four to six times as likely to reform as regimes older than 5 years.
1Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) define regime spells as uninterrupted reign of the same group of political
elites. Accordingly, coups only constitute a transition if they substantially alter the composition of the ruling
group. By contrast, coups that, e.g., replace one military leader by another from the same group of military
leadership do not constitute transition events.
2The hazards are estimated by differencing and smoothing over Nelson-Aalen estimates for the cumulative
hazard rate and are adjusted for left and right censoring. All findings are robust to controlling for the current
political system and region fixed effects (see Appendix A.2 for details). Similar patterns have been documented
by Sanhueza (1999) and Svolik (2008, 2015). Relatedly, Bienen and van de Walle (1989, 1992) and Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) find a declining risk of loosing power at the level of political leaders.
4
(a) Revolt Hazard
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
Maturity (in years)
H
a
za
rd
(n
o
rm
a
li
ze
d
)
(b) Reform Hazard
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
5
10
Maturity (in years)
H
a
za
rd
(n
or
m
a
li
ze
d
)
Figure 1: Empirical transition hazards for revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel). Notes.—Hazards are
normalized relative to the unconditional hazard of revolts and reforms, respectively. Shaded bands correspond
to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the country level.
Fact 3: Transition hazards are inverse “J-shaped” in the inclusiveness of political systems.
The regularity that regimes at the extremes of the political spectrum are most stable has
been documented by a number of recent studies (e.g., Bremmer, 2006; Gates et al., 2006;
Goldstone et al., 2010; Knutsen and Nyg˚ard, 2015). To evaluate the regularity in our data,
we estimate a Cox model with a cubic spline in the polity dimension (see Appendix A.2
for further details). Figure 2 plots the predicted relationship between polities and hazard
ratios, normalized relative to the most autocratic regimes (with polity score equal to zero).
Full-scaled democracies (with polity score of one) are least vulnerable to transitions with a
relative hazard of approximately 1/5. Hybrid regimes, in contrast, are on average up to four
times as likely to undergo a transition compared to the most autocratic regimes.
Fact 4: Revolts establish autocratic regimes; reforms establish democratic regimes.
Figure 3 shows the conditional distribution over political systems arising from revolts and
reforms. The median revolt establishes an (“autocratic”) regime with a polity score of 0.2.
The median reform establishes a (“democratic”) regime with a polity score of 0.8. Political
systems near the center of the autocracy-democracy spectrum are unlikely to arise from either
mode of transition.3
3See also Gleditsch and Choung 2004; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Der-
panopoulos et al. 2016. The results are also consistent with a number of qualitative studies documenting that
democracies are unlikely to arise without a reform process (Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
Karl, 1990; Huntington, 1991).
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Figure 2: Estimated hazard ratios of political systems. Notes.—Hazard ratios are estimated by a Cox
regression with a cubic spline in the polity dimension. All hazard rates are for the combined failure due to
reform and revolt, and are normalized relative to the combined hazard of regimes with a polity score of zero.
Shaded bands correspond to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the country level.
(a) Regimes after revolt
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
Polity score
F
ra
ct
io
n
(b) Regimes after reform
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
Polity score
F
ra
ct
io
n
Figure 3: Empirical distribution of political systems arising from revolts (left panel) and reforms (right
panel). Notes.—Shaded bands correspond to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the
country level.
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Figure 4: Empirical distribution of political systems between 1946 and 2010. Notes.—Unit of observation
are country-days. Shaded bands correspond to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the
country level.
Fact 5: The distribution of regime types (polities) is bi-modal, with mass concentrated
towards the extremes.
Finally, as illustrated in Figure 4, most mass of the empirical distribution over regime
types is concentrated towards the extremes of the political spectrum: The combined mass of
observations with a polity score ≤ 0.25 and a polity score ≥ 0.75 is 84 percent.
3 The Model
We set up a simple, dynamic model of repeated political transitions that are driven by revolts
and reforms. Political systems are defined by the fraction of the population with access to
power and can attain any value in [0, 1].
3.1 Setup
We consider an infinite horizon economy, populated by overlapping generations of two-period
lived agents. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents with mass equal to 1. At
time t, fraction λt of the population has the power to implement political decisions; the
remaining agents are excluded from political power. We refer to these two groups as (political)
“insiders” and “outsiders.”
When born, the distribution of political power among the young is inherited from their
parent generation; that is, λt agents are born as insiders, while 1 − λt agents are born as
outsiders. Agents who are born as outsiders can attempt to overthrow the current regime and
thereby acquire political power. To this end, outsiders choose individually and simultaneously
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whether or not to participate in a revolt. Because all political change will take effect at the
beginning of the next period (see below), only young outsiders have an interest in participating
in a revolt. We denote young outsider i’s choice by φit ∈ {0, 1} and use the aggregated mass
of supporters, st =
∫
φit di, to refer to the size of the resulting revolt.
Given the mass of supporters st, the probability that a revolt is successful is given by
p(θt, st) = θth(st), (1)
where θt ∈ Θ is a random state of the world that reflects the vulnerability of the current
regime or their ability to put down a revolt, and h is an increasing and twice differentiable
function, h : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with h(0) = 0. Intuitively, the threat of a revolt to the current
regime is increasing in the mass of revolutionaries and in the regime’s vulnerability. When a
revolt has no supporters (st = 0) or the regime is not vulnerable (θt = 0), the regime survives
with certainty.
The state of θt follows a (commonly known) Markov process with c.d.f. G(θt|θt−1) and is
assumed to have full support on [0, 1]. At the beginning of each period, insiders learn the
current realization of θt. By contrast, outsiders do not observe θt directly and instead use
Bayes’ law to form beliefs over its current realization based on the history of past political
transitions. We use Ft to denote the belief of outsiders over θt at the beginning of period t.
After learning the realization of θt, insiders may try to alleviate the threat of a revolt by
conducting reforms. We follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) by modeling these reforms
as an extension of the franchise to outsiders, which is effective in preventing them from
supporting a revolt. Generalizing this mechanism to a continuous polity space, we allow
insiders to continuously extend the regime by any fraction, xt − λt, of young outsiders, where
xt ∈ [λt, 1] denotes the reformed political system. Because preferences of insiders will be
perfectly aligned, there is no need to specify the decision making process leading to xt in
detail.
Given the (aggregated) policy choices st and xt, and conditional on the outcome of a
revolt, the political system evolves as follows:
λt+1 =
st if the regime is overthrown, andxt otherwise. (2)
When a revolt fails (indicated by ηt = 0), reforms take effect and the old regime stays in
power. The resulting political system in t + 1 is then given by xt. In the complementary
case, when a revolt succeeds (ηt = 1), those who have participated will form the new regime.
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Note that this specification prevents non-revolting outsiders from reaping the benefits from
overthrowing a regime so that there are no gains from free-riding in our model.
To complete the model description, we still have to specify how payoffs are distributed
across the two groups of agents at t. As for outsiders, we assume that they receive a per period
payoff of γit that is privately assigned to each agent at birth and is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. This heterogeneity is meant to reflect differences in the propensity to
revolt, possibly resulting from different degrees of economical or ideological adaption to a
regime. Outsiders’ payoffs remain constant over their life if they abstain from revolting, and
otherwise change conditional on the success of the revolt (detailed below).
In contrast, insiders enjoy per period payoffs u(λt), where u is twice differentiable, u
′ < 0,
and u(1) is normalized to unity. We think of u(·) as a reduced form function that captures
the various benefits of having political power (e.g., from extracting a common resource stock,
implementing preferred policies, etc.).4 Note that u′ < 0 implies that extending the regime is
costly for insiders (e.g., because resources have to be shared, or preferences about policies
become less aligned). Also, u(1) = 1 implies that u(λt) ≥ γit for all λt and γit; that is, being
part of the regime is always desirable. In the case of full democracy (λt = 1) all citizens are
insiders and enjoy utility normalized to the one of a perfectly adapted outsider.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that members of an overthrown regime and participants
in a failed revolt become worst-adapted to the new regime (γit = 0).
5 For the upcoming
analysis it will be convenient to define the (future) utility of agents that are born at time t,
which is given by:
V I(ηt, xt) = (1− ηt)u(xt), (3)
V O(ηt, γit, st, φit) = φitηtu(st) + (1− φit)γit, (4)
where superscript I and O denote agents that are born as (or are newly enfranchised) insiders
and outsiders, respectively. In both cases, the terms correspond to the second period payoffs
accruing from date t+ 1 (which are a function of date-t choices). The first period payoffs are
omitted, as they are unaffected by the policy choices of generation t.
The timing of events within one period can be summarized as follows:
4One could microfound u as a value function where all policy choices associated with having political
power—except enfranchising political outsiders—are chosen optimally. Subsuming these decisions into u
allows us to tractably explore the dynamics of political systems emerging from the interplay of reforms and
revolts. All other policy choices still affect our analysis inasmuch as they determine the shape of u.
5In our dataset, 83 percent of overthrown leaders are killed, imprisoned or sentenced to exile under the new
regime. Similar punishments are common for supporters of failed insurgencies, making the assumption that
the losing party is worst-adapted arguably realistic. Further note that this assumption effectively maximizes
the cost of engaging in political confrontation.
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1. The current state of θt realizes and is revealed to insiders.
2. Insiders may extend political power to a fraction xt ∈ [λt, 1] of the population.
3. Outsiders, if excluded from the reform, individually and simultaneously decide whether
or not to participate in a revolt.
4. Transitions according to (1) and (2) take place, period t+ 1 starts with the birth of a
new generation, and payoffs determined by λt+1 are realized.
Two remarks The core of our model defines an interaction between revolutionary pressure
and preemptive reforms in the tradition of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), Conley and
Temini (2001), and Boix (2003). Implicit in the preemptive logic of reforms is the requirement
that extending the franchise entails a credible commitment to share political power that is not
easily reversible. Accordingly, our notion of inclusiveness, λt, is best understood as the fraction
of citizens that are protected from losing political power, either because of hard-to-overturn
institutional guarantees as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), or because each insider is
indispensable for the stability of the ruling coalition as in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin
(2012). In line with this interpretation of λt, as well as with the low frequency of autocratic
consolidations in the data, our model abstracts from the possibility of “adverse reforms”.6
Relatedly, we assume that reforms are effective in the sense that newly enfranchised
outsiders (as well as agents born as insiders) do not rebel against the regime. As formally
proved in Appendix B.1, this is indeed internally consistent within our setting, as newly
enfranchised outsiders (and born insiders) would never support a revolt if given the choice.
Equilibrium definition We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria subject to
two equilibrium refinements. First, we rule out “instable” coordination among outsiders on
st = 0, whenever an infinitesimal small chance of success would persuade a non-marginal
mass of outsiders to revolt.7 Second, we limit attention to equilibria that are consistent with
the D1 criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987), a standard refinement for signaling
6In addition to the aforementioned reasons, abstracting from adverse reforms is also analytically convenient,
as it allows us to treat insiders as a homogeneous group, rather than providing an explicit model of within-regime
power struggles that may result in the ejection of certain subgroups.
7In a previous version of this paper (Buchheim and Ulbricht, 2014), we demonstrate that this restriction is
formally equivalent to characterizing the set of trembling-hand perfect equilibria (at the expense of additional
notation). An alternative (and outcome-equivalent) approach to rule out these instabilities would be to restrict
attention to equilibria which are the limit to a sequence of economies with a finite number of outsiders, where
each agent’s decision has non-zero weight on st.
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games.8 As detailed below (see Footnote 11), the refinement improves the predictive power of
our model by selecting a unique equilibrium, but is inconsequential for our main predictions.
Before defining equilibrium, it is useful to fix some notation. First, as already noted, we
use Ft to denote the “prior” belief of young outsiders born at date t, which is formed using
Bayes’ law (if applicable) given all publicly observable information available at the beginning
of period t. Specifically, we have
Ft(ϑ) = Pr [θ ≤ ϑ|δt−1] (5)
for any publicly observable history δt ≡ {{φiτ}, xτ , λτ , ητ}tτ=0 that is reached along the
equilibrium path with strictly positive probability. As usual, off-equilibrium beliefs can be
chosen freely, subject to the restrictions imposed by the D1 criterion. Similarly, we use Fˆt to
denote the interim belief of outsiders, which combines Ft with the information signaled by
reforms xt:
Fˆt(ϑ) = Pr [θ ≤ ϑ|δt−1, xt] (6)
for all (δt−1, xt) reached along the equilibrium path. Here we do not index Ft and Fˆt by i,
since they will be pinned down uniquely by the D1-refinement—even off the equilibrium
path—ruling out any scope for belief heterogeneity across outsiders.
We are now ready to define the equilibrium for our model. To simplify notation, we only
define pure strategies here, since only pure strategy equilibria exist in our game (see the
proofs to Propositions 1 and 2).
Definition. Given a history δ¯ = {δτ , θτ}t−1τ=0, an equilibrium in this economy consists of
strategies xδ¯ : θ 7→ x and {φiδ : (Fˆ , x) 7→ φi}, and (interim) beliefs Fˆδ : x 7→ Fˆ , such that for
all histories δ¯:
a. Reforms xδ¯ maximize insider’s expected utility V
I(pδ¯, xδ¯) given outsiders’ beliefs Fˆδ and
strategies {φiδ};
b. Each outsider’s revolt choice φiδ maximizes EFˆδ{V O(pδ¯, γiδ¯, sδ¯, φiδ)} given insiders’ re-
forms xδ¯, other outsiders’ revolt choices {φjδ}j 6=i, and beliefs Fˆδ;9
8The D1 criterion restricts outsiders to believe that whenever they observe a reform x′ that is not conducted
in equilibrium, the reform has been implemented by a regime with vulnerability θ′, for which a deviation to
x′ would be most attractive in the sense that it is beneficial under the largest set of possible inferences {θˆ}
about the regime’s vulnerability.
9Throughout we use subscripts to E to indicate the probability measure with respect to which the
expectation is taken.
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c. Beliefs Fˆδ are obtained using (6) for all (δt−1, xt) along the equilibrium path, and satisfy
the D1 criterion otherwise;
d. The evolution of (λt, ηt), contained in δ¯, is consistent with (1) and (2);
e. Coordination among outsiders is stable; i.e., perturbing perceived coordination sˆδ¯ by 
changes the coordination outcome sδ¯ by at most ν where ν → 0 as → 0.
3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
As a result of the overlapping generations structure of the model, the characterization of
equilibrium can be separated into a sequence of “generation games” between young insiders
and young outsiders. Generations are linked across periods through the evolution of the
payoff-relevant state, given by St ≡ (θt, λt, Ft).
The generation game at t consists of two stages. In the second stage, outsiders have to
choose whether or not to support a revolt. Because the likelihood that a revolt succeeds
depends on the total mass of its supporters, outsiders face a coordination problem in their
decision to revolt. In the first stage, prior to this coordination problem, insiders decide
on the degree to which political power is extended to outsiders. On the one hand this will
decrease revolutionary pressure along the extensive margin by contracting the pool of potential
insurgents. On the other hand, extending the regime may also contain information about
the regime’s vulnerability. As a result, reforms may increase revolutionary pressure along the
intensive margin by increasing coordination among outsiders who are not subject to reforms.
Insiders’ policy choices will therefore be governed by signaling considerations.
We proceed by backward induction in solving for the equilibrium of the generation game,
beginning with the outsiders’ coordination problem.
Stage 2: Coordination among outsiders Consider the outsiders’ coordination problem
at time t. Let θˆt ≡ EFˆt{θt} define the interim-expectation of outsiders regarding θt. Because
EFˆ{V O(·)} is linear in θ, θˆt is a sufficient statistic for Fˆt. For any belief, (θˆt, sˆt) ∈ [0, 1]2,
individual rationality requires all outsiders to choose a φit that maximizes their expected
utility EFˆ{V O(·)}. At time t, outsider i with opportunity cost γit will therefore participate in
a revolt if and only if
γit ≤ p(θˆt, sˆt)u(sˆt) ≡ γ¯(θˆt, sˆt). (7)
In equilibrium, γ¯(θˆt, sˆt) is the expected benefit of participating in a revolt that is supported
by a mass sˆt of outsiders. Since γ¯ is independent of γit, it follows that in any equilibrium the
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set of outsiders who support a revolt at t is given by the agents who are least adapted to the
current regime. For any γ¯, the size of the resulting revolt is then given by
st = (1− xt) min{γ¯(θˆt, sˆt), 1}. (8)
In equilibrium, it must hold that st = sˆt. Accordingly, the share of outsiders supporting a
revolt is pinned down by the fixed point to (8). To guarantee that a well-behaved fixed point
exists, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let ψ(s) ≡ h(s) · u(s). Then, ψ′ ≥ 0, ψ′′ ≤ 0 and lims→0 ψ′(s) =∞.
Assumption 1 imposes that the participation choices of outsiders are strategic complements.
This requires that the positive effect of an additional supporter on the success probability
outweighs the negative effect of being in a slightly larger regime after a successful revolt.
To ensure existence, we further require that the positive effect of an additional supporter is
sufficiently strong when a revolt is smallest, and is nonincreasing as revolts grow larger.
Equipped with Assumption 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt at time t is
uniquely characterized by the solution to (8), given by the time-invariant mapping s : (θˆt, xt) 7→
st. The solution satisfies s(0, ·) = s(·, 1) = 0, increases in θˆt, and decreases in xt.
All proofs are in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes the tradeoff of conducting reforms:
On the one hand, reforms reduce support for a revolt along the extensive margin. In particular,
in the limit where regimes reform to a full-scaled democracy, any threat of revolt is completely
dissolved. On the other hand, if reforms signal that a regime is vulnerable, they may backfire
by increasing support along the intensive margin.
Stage 1: Reforms by insiders We now turn to the insiders’ decision problem. Since more
vulnerable regimes have higher incentives to reform than less vulnerable ones, conducting
reforms will be associated with being intrinsically weak and, therefore, indeed increases
coordination along the intensive margin. For the benefits along the extensive margin to
justify these costs, reforms have to be far-reaching, inducing regimes to enfranchise a large
portion of the population whenever they conduct reforms. The next proposition describes the
equilibrium schedule of reforms.
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Proposition 2. Define insiders’ expected utility as V˜ I(θ, θˆ, x) ≡ V I(θh(s(θˆ, x)), x), and let ξ
be the differential equation solving10
ξ′(θ) = −V˜ I2 (θ, θ, ξ)/V˜ I3 (θ, θ, ξ) > 0
with boundary condition ξ(1) = arg maxξ∈[0,1] V˜ I(1, 1, ξ). Then, in any equilibrium, policy
choices of insiders are uniquely defined by the time-invariant function, x : (θt, λt, Ft) 7→ xt,
x(θ, λ, F ) =
λ if θ ≤ θ¯(λ, F )ξ(θ) if θ > θ¯(λ, F )
with ξ(θ) > λ for all θ > θ¯(λ, F ). The threshold type, θ¯ : (λt, Ft) 7→ θ¯t, is implicitly defined by
(whenever a solution exists)
V˜ I(θ¯, θ¯, ξ(θ¯)) = V˜ I(θ¯, θˆ(λ, λ, F ), λ), (9)
and is otherwise given by θ¯ = 1. Outsiders’ interim beliefs are defined by11, θˆ : (λt, xt, Ft) 7→ θˆt,
with
θˆ(λ, x, F ) =
EF{θ|θ ≤ θ¯(λ, F )} if x = λξ−1(x) if ξ(θ¯(λ)) ≤ x ≤ ξ(1).
Proposition 2 describes equilibrium reforms as a function of (θt, λt, Ft). Because the logic
behind these choices is the same for all values of λt and Ft, we can discuss the underlying
intuition keeping (λt, Ft) fixed. To this end, Figure 5 plots reform choices (left panel) and the
implied probability to be overthrown (right panel), fixing λt = 0.1 and Ft(θ) = θ. Extended
versions of the figure with alternative values for λt and Ft can be found in Appendix E.
Whenever θt ≤ θ¯(λt, Ft), insiders do not reform (xt = λt), implying a substantial threat
for regimes with θt close to θ¯t. To see the logic behind this, first consider Figure 6. Here we
plot equilibrium beliefs (left panel) and the corresponding mass of insurgents (right panel)
as functions of xt. If there are no reforms, outsiders only know the average vulnerability,
θˆpoolt ≡ EFt{θt|θt ≤ θ¯t}, of all regimes pooling on xt = λt. By contrast, every extension x of
the regime—how small it may be—leads to a non-marginal change in outsiders’ beliefs from
10Throughout, we use fi to denote the derivative with respect to the i-th argument of some function f .
11Off the equilibrium path, beliefs are uniquely pinned down by the D1 criterion as θˆt = θ¯(λt) for
x ∈ (λt, ξ(θ¯t)) and θˆt = 1 for x > ξ(1), contributing to the overall uniqueness of the reform schedule. However,
even without D1, reforms are always increasing, starting from a strictly positive pool at xt = λt and have a
discontinuity at the marginally reforming regime θ¯t. Accordingly, the D1 refinement merely pins down the
precise shape of ξ, but is not substantial for generating any of the main features of the reform schedule.
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θˆpoolt to ξ
−1(x) ≥ θ¯t and, therefore, causes a non-marginal increase in revolutionary pressure
along the intensive margin. It follows that small reforms will always backfire and increase the
mass of insurgents as the increase in coordination dominates any marginal reduction in the
group of potential insurgents along the extensive margin.
Furthermore, optimality of reforms requires that the benefit of reducing pressure compen-
sates for insiders’ disliking of sharing power. Hence there exists a nonempty interval, depicted
by [x˜, ξ(θ¯t)] in the right panel of Figure 6, in which reforms are effective, yet insiders prefer
to “gamble for their survival” in order to hold on to the benefits of not sharing power. This
causes a substantial threat for regimes with θt close to θ¯t, which can reconcile a frequent
occurrence of revolts with the co-occurrence of preemptive reforms.12
12More precisely, gambling for survival increases the revolt hazard in two ways. Firstly, since at the margin
more vulnerable regimes join the pool at xt = λt, these regimes obviously face a high threat by not reforming.
Secondly, since these regimes also deteriorate the average pooling belief towards being more vulnerable, there
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Learning dynamics Propositions 1 and 2 fully characterize actions at t conditional on St.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we have to describe how St evolves over time.
The evolution of θt and λt is described by the processes G and (2), leaving us to characterize
the law of motion for Ft.
Let F˜t define the “posterior” belief of outsiders living at date t, formed using Bayes’ law,
given all publicly available information at the end of period t,
F˜t(ϑ) = Pr[θ ≤ ϑ|δt].
Intuitively, F˜t combines the prior Ft with the information signaled by xt (yielding the interim-
belief Fˆt) and the information contained in whether or not the regime survives, ηt.
Once we have compute F˜t, we can use it to obtain the prior of the next generation, Ft+1,
by simply “forecasting” θt+1 using the law of motion for θt:
Ft+1(ϑ) =
∫ ϑ
0
∫ 1
0
G′(θ′|θ) dF˜t(θ) dθ′ (10)
We complete our equilibrium characterization with an explicit characterization of F˜t.
Proposition 3. Let M it (ϑ) ≡ EFt{θi|θ ≤ ϑ} define the i-th (raw) moment of Ft(θ|θ ≤ ϑ).
Then, along the equilibrium path, outsiders’ posterior is given by:
(i) if there is a reform attempt (xt > λt),
F˜t(ϑ) =
0 if ϑ < θt1 else,
(ii) if there is a revolt and no reform attempt (xt = λt and ηt = 1),
F˜t(ϑ) =

Ft(ϑ)
Ft(θ¯t)
M1t (ϑ)
M1t (θ¯t)
if ϑ < θ¯t
1 else,
(iii) if there is no transition (xt = λt and ηt = 0),
F˜t(ϑ) =

Ft(ϑ)
Ft(θ¯t)
· 1−h(st)M1t (ϑ)
1−h(st)M1t (θ¯t) if ϑ < θ¯t
1 else.
is a further infra-marginal increase in the threat that affects all regimes without reforms.
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For later reference, it is useful to also compute the first two moments of F˜t. Specifically,
using Proposition 3, the posterior mean and variance are given by
µ˜t =

θt if xt > λt
M2t (θ¯t)
M1t (θ¯t)
if xt = λt and ηt = 1
M1t (θ¯t)−h(st)M2t (θ¯t)
1−h(st)M1t (θ¯t) if xt = λt and ηt = 0
(11)
and
σ˜2t =

0 if xt > λt
M3t (θ¯t)
M1t (θ¯t)
− µ˜2t if xt = λt and ηt = 1
M2t (θ¯t)−h(st)M3t (θ¯t)
1−h(st)M1t (θ¯t) − µ˜
2
t if xt = λt and ηt = 0.
(12)
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium Propositions 1–2 uniquely pin down insiders’
and outsiders’ actions conditional on St, whereas Proposition 3 (in conjunction with G and
(2)) pins down a unique law of motion for St. We conclude that there is no scope for multiple
equilibria in our model. Verifying that an equilibrium exists, then permits us to reach the
following conclusion.
Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium, in which for all histories δ¯, policy mappings xδ¯
and {φiδ}1i=0, as well as beliefs Fδ correspond to the time-invariant mappings underlying
Propositions 1–3. Furthermore, for any given initial state S0, the equilibrium is unique.
4 Model Implications for Political Dynamics
To explore the empirical performance of the model, we fit it to a few key moments of the
data. We first study the implications for the frequency of transitions, hazard rates, transition
outcomes, and the stationary distribution of political systems. Overall, the model fits the
patterns documented in Section 2 quite well, even those that are not targeted by the estimation.
Then, in the next section, we provide intuition for our results and illustrate how the different
features of the model contribute to matching the data.
4.1 Parametrization
We choose the following parametrization of the model. The utility of insiders and the likelihood
of a successful revolt are given by u(λ) = 1 + αu(1 − λ) and h(s) = sαh . Here, αu is the
marginal disutility of extending the regime, whereas αh defines the elasticity of pt with respect
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to an additional revolutionary. The restrictions we imposed on u and h require αu, αh ∈ (0, 1)
and αu ≤ αh. Based on some initial exploration, we found that the latter constraint is
typically binding when trying to implement a stationary distribution with non-trivial mass
on autocracies.13 Accordingly, we fix αu = αh ≡ α to reduce the computational complexity of
the estimation.
Next, we set G so that θt follows a truncated AR(1) process,
θt = min(max(ρθt−1 + t, 0), 1),
with persistence rate ρ ∈ [0, 1) and innovations t that are i.i.d. normal with mean µ
and variance σ2 . Observe that for σ sufficiently small, the mean and variance of Ft+1 are
approximately given by:
µt+1 = ρµ˜t + µ (13)
σ2t+1 = ρ
2σ˜2t + σ
2
 . (14)
One challenge in simulating the model over long periods of time is that Ft typically does
not stay within a given parametric family of distributions, making it difficult to keep track
of beliefs over time. To address this issue, we approximate Ft+1, derived in (10), by a Beta
distribution with mean µt+1 and variance σ
2
t+1 matching the corresponding moments of Ft+1
as given by (13) and (14). We explore the accurateness of the approximation in Appendix D,
finding it to be extremely precise. Since the Beta distribution is fully parametrized by its
first two moments, this approach allows us to efficiently keep track of outsiders beliefs using
just µt and σ
2
t .
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With our approximation for Ft, the state space reduces to St = (θt, λt, µt, σ2t ). Throughout
our exploration, we will take the stand that θt is inherently unobserved to the statistician (as
it is in the data), meaning that we will only look at moments where θt is marginalized out.
In addition to ensuring consistency with the empirical moments, this view turns out to be
also convenient, as it allows us to eliminate θt from St when characterizing the stationary
distribution, requiring us to only keep track of (λt, µt, σ
2
t ).
15
13For small αu, autocracies are less profitable and regimes tend to reform frequently, resulting in a large
mass of democracies relative to autocracies.
14The approach is similar to the ubiquitous practice of solving models with complex state-spaces by
approximating the perceived dependence on distributions by their first two moments as in Krusell and Smith
(1998).
15In particular, exploiting that the information set of the statistician is aligned with the one of outsiders, we
use a hidden state forward algorithm where instead of keeping track of θt, we use Ft to keep track of distributions
over θt that are consistent with a particular (publicly observed) history δ = {λτ , µτ , σ2τ}tτ=0. Specifically, at
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We approximate the continuous state space with a finite grid. Specifically, we approximate
λ using a grid of (almost16) linearly spaced points λ1, λ2, . . . , λNλ on [0, 1], where we set
Nλ = 21 to match the discretization in the data. Similarly, we specify grids of linearly spaced
points µ1, µ2, . . . , µNµ on [0, 1] and log-linearly spaced points σ1, σ2, . . . , µNσ on [0, 1/2], with
Nµ = Nσ = 20, to define the belief process.
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The parameterized model is described by four parameters, ω ≡ (α, ρ, µ, σ). We choose ω
to match, as closely as possible, a list of empirical moments Mˆ (described below). Let M(ω)
denote the mapping from ω to the corresponding model moments. A detailed description of
the algorithm implementing M is given in Appendix C. Our estimator for ω is given by
ωˆ = arg min
ω
(
Mˆ −M(ω)
)′
Vˆ −1
(
Mˆ −M(ω)
)
, (15)
where Vˆ is a diagonal matrix with the bootstrapped variances of Mˆ along the diagonal.
The estimated parameter values are αˆ = .569, µˆ/(1 − ρˆ) = .736, σˆ2/(1 − ρˆ2) = .030, and
ρˆ = .9997. These values imply that elites in an autocratic system enjoy roughly 60 percent
higher value than citizen in a full-scale democracy. The process for θ is highly persistent,
with unconditional mean of .736 and unconditional variance of .030.
4.2 Predicted Dynamics
The empirical and simulated moments, targeted by our estimation, are presented in Table 2.
All model moments are computed at the stationary distribution. Specifically, we target nine
moments, chosen to reflect the regularities presented in Section 2: (i) the co-occurrence of
revolts and reforms, summarized by the ratio of revolts to reforms; (ii) the negative relation
between transition hazards and regime maturity, summarized by the revolt and reform hazard
for new regimes relative to the respective average hazards; (iii) the inverse J-shape of transition
hazards in political inclusiveness, summarized by the hazard ratio at the peak of the inverse
J-curve and at the most inclusive system (λ = λNλ), both normalized relative to the least
each point of time, our algorithm computes the transition function Pr[(λt+1, µt+1, σ
2
t+1)|(λt, µt, σ2t )] by first
solving the generation game conditionally on (θt, λt, µt, σt) and then integrating over θt using Ft as probability
measure. The resulting marginal distribution over δ—which is sufficient to compute all moments of interest to
us—is identical to the one resulting from solving the model on its full state space, since Bayesian consistency
requires that for any δ, the unconditional distribution over S, denoted by P, satisfies P(θ|δ) = F (θ|δ).
16Specifically, we chose thresholds {.025, .075, . . . , .975}, defining the edges between two adjacent grid points
{λi, λi+1}, such that the mid-points of each λ-bin, {.05, .1 . . . , .95}, match the desired discretization of λ in
the interior of the grid. At the boundaries, we obtain λ1 = .0125 and λNλ = .9875 as the mid-points of the
two most extreme λ-bins.
17Observe that the standard deviation of the Beta distribution is bounded above by 1/2. We chose a
log-linearly spaced grid for σt as the distribution over σt is strongly right-skewed.
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Table 2: Data Moments and Model Simulated Moments
Fitted Moments Data Model
Revolt-reform ratio 2.85 2.82
(0.39)
Revolt-hazard for new regimes/avg. hazard 3.04 2.04
(0.86)
Reform-hazard for new regimes/avg. hazard 6.90 8.95
(2.72)
Total transition hazard by λ: peak/autocracy 4.29 3.21
(1.92)
Total transition hazard by λ: democracy/autocracy 0.18 0.04
(0.16)
Median revolt 0.20 0.20
(0.02)
Median reform 0.80 0.80
(0.02)
Unconditional mass on λ ≤ 0.25 0.42 0.47
(0.03)
Unconditional mass on λ ≥ 0.75 0.42 0.47
(0.04)
Notes.—Bootstrap standard errors for the data, clustered at the country-level, are in parenthesis.
All model moments are computed at the stationary distribution. The empirical moments are
based on the data presented in Section 2.
inclusive system (λ = λ1); (iv) the polarization of new regimes, summarized by the median
revolt and reform; and (v) the concentration of mass towards the extremes of the stationary
distribution P(λ), summarized by P(λ ≤ 0.25) and P(λ ≥ 0.75).
Overall, the model fits the targeted moments quite well, with most model moments being
within one standard deviation of their empirical counterpart. The exception is the stationary
distribution, where the model over-predicts the concentration towards the extremes by 1.5
standard deviations, and the revolt hazard for new regimes, which the model under-predicts
relative to the corresponding average rate. Despite some discrepancies, the estimated model
is clearly able to replicate the documented regularities.
For further evaluation of the model fit, we next study how well the model matches the
precise shape of the transition hazards, conditional outcome distributions, and stationary
distribution depicted in Figures 1–4. Beyond targeting the statistics in Table 2, none of these
shapes are targeted by our estimation.
Figure 7 shows the corresponding relations for the estimated model. For convenience, the
graphs also include the empirical relations from Section 2. Overall the model fits the data
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Figure 7: Comparison between model (solid red lines) and data (crossed blue lines). None of the depicted
relations are directly targeted by the estimation.
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very well. We do not fully capture the shape of the relation between revolt hazard and regime
maturity and we slightly underpredict the reform hazard for very mature regimes, but we
capture the average rates at which these hazards decline in maturity—steeply for reforms and
relatively slowly for revolts. Similarly, the model captures the inverse J-shape of transition
hazards in inclusiveness, although it slightly underpredicts the hazard for the most inclusive
regimes. Finally, the fit of the conditional outcome distributions and stationary distribution
is almost perfect.
5 Understanding the Key Features of the Model
In this section, we provide intuition for how the different features of the model contribute to
explaining the empirical facts.
Co-occurrence of revolts and reforms In the estimated model, revolts are almost three
times as likely as reforms. Why are there so many coercive transitions if regimes could
preempt any revolt by extending political power to outsiders?
There are two reasons. First, reforms are costly so that regimes are willing to tolerate some
risk of failure in order to hold on to power. If sharing power would bear no costs (αu → 0),
then clearly any regime would immediately transform to a perfectly inclusive democracy and
there were no incentives to ever revolt. Second, as detailed in Proposition 2, asymmetric
information reduces the effectiveness of reforms and detains regimes from conducting small
reforms altogether. If instead the realization of θt would be observed by outsiders, reforms
have no signaling value and simply solve
xsym(λ, θ) = arg max
x∈[λ,1]
V˜ I(θ, θ, x).
Generally, xsym lies strictly above the equilibrium schedule characterized in Proposition 2. I.e.,
not only are small reforms precluded by asymmetric information, but more generally they are
biased downwards. Asymmetric information therefore reduces the likelihood of reforms and
tends to increase the likelihood of revolts (see Figure 20 in the appendix for an illustration).
To gauge the quantitative importance of these factors, we re-solve the model for different
values of αu and for the case with symmetric information. All other parameters remain fixed
at their estimated values. Table 3 reports the resulting revolt-reform ratios and the mass
on “autocracies” (with λ ≤ .25) relative to “democracies” (with λ ≥ .75) at the stationary
distribution. Clearly, both of the aforementioned factors are crucial for revolts to be the
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Table 3: Frequency of Revolts for Alternative Parameters and Without Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information Symmetric information
Cost of sharing power
(αu)
Revolt-reform
ratio
Autocracy-
democracy
ratio
Revolt-reform
ratio
Autocracy-
democracy
ratio
0.15 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.03
0.30 0.95 0.30 0.18 0.20
0.45 1.86 0.39 1.07 0.52
0.57 2.82 0.99 1.48 0.46
Notes.—The model is solved for different values of αu. All other parameters are fixed at their estimated
values. The autocracy-democracy ratio defines the mass of regimes with λ ≤ .25 relative to the mass of
regimes with λ ≥ .75 at the stationary distribution.
dominant driver of transitions. If information were symmetric, then for any value of αu,
18 the
revolt-reform ratio drops below 1.5 (compared to 2.85 in the data), and P(λ ≥ .75) exceeds
P(λ ≤ .25) by a factor of at least two (compared to equal shares in the data).
Transition hazards and maturity Consider next the declining shape of transition hazards
in regime maturity. The driving force behind this is a perceived “stabilization”, reflected in
a decline in outsiders’ prior mean, µt, as a regime becomes more mature. Specifically, from
equation (11), it follows that for any St,19
µt+1|(reformt) ≥ µt+1|(revoltt) > µt+1|(no transitiont). (16)
After reforms (and revolts against reforming regimes), outsiders fully learn θt, which condi-
tionally on a reform is larger than θ¯t. Similarly, Bayesian updating implies that θt is likely
to be high when a revolt is observed in the absence of reforms. In contrast, when neither a
reform nor a revolt are observed, Bayesian updating implies that θt is likely to be low. As a
regime ages, it is therefore perceived to be less and less vulnerable. Accordingly, joining a
revolt becomes less and less attractive, reducing both the number of outsiders supporting a
revolt and the incentives of insiders to reform.20
18Recall that αu is bounded above by αh, limiting the permissible range of αu to [0, αh]. While increasing
both αu and αh jointly may in principle increase the relative frequency of revolts, it does not do so in our case
as an higher elasticity αh increases the effectiveness of reforms, thwarting the effect of increasing their costs.
19To see this, recall that M2 defines the second raw moment, which is bounded by (M1)2 < M2 ≤M1 (the
lower bound is strict as VarF˜ [θt] = M
2 − (M1)2 > 0 for xt = λt). Evaluating (11) at the upper and lower
bound for M2, respectively, and combining with (13) yields the two inequalities stated in (16).
20If θt is unobserved to the statistician (as it is both in our computations and in the data), the belief effect
is further strengthened by statistical selection, which, similarly to outsiders’ beliefs, places more probability
mass on stable realizations of θt for older regimes. See the second step in the proof of Proposition 5 for a
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Observe that (16) holds under any Ft and does not hinge on the shape of G (or on our Beta-
approximation to (10)). To strengthen this point, consider the limit where Pr(θt = θt−1)→ 1
(θ is fully persistent) and Ft is computed exactly (without approximation).
Proposition 5. Let G such that Pr(θt = θt−1)→ 1. Then the revolt and reform hazards are
decreasing in the maturity of a regime. Specifically, for any S0, if xs = λ0 and ηs = 0 for all
s < t, then
Prt(ηt = 1) < Prt−1(ηt−1 = 1) and Prt(xt > λt) = 0.
Proposition 5 proves for perfectly persistent θ that the revolt and reform hazards are
declining in regime maturity. The decline in the reform hazard is especially stark, as it drops
to zero for all but newly emerged regimes. While this extreme decline in the reform hazard is
an artifact of Pr(θt = θt−1)→ 1, it is reminiscent of the steep decline seen in the estimated
model and the data.
Transition hazards and inclusiveness The inverse J-shape of transition hazards in λ is
the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, as just explained, transition hazards are
increasing in the prior mean µt. On the other hand, transition hazards are declining in λt.
The logic is similar to the one driving the dependence on µt: As the regime becomes more
inclusive, revolts are more likely to fail, which makes it even less attractive for remaining
outsiders to support a revolt and further reduces incentives for insiders to reform.
These two forces are opposing, because µt is positively linked to λt through statistical
selection: As further detailed below, large regimes emerge from reforms, implying that they
are perceived to be weak (µ˜t−1 = θt−1 ≥ θ¯t−1), whereas small regimes typically emerge from
revolts against pooling regimes, implying that they are perceived to be relatively strong
(µ˜t−1 ≤ θ¯t−1).21 Moreover, because s is increasing in the perceived likelihood of success
(Proposition 1), it is precisely revolts that ex-ante were considered as futile that give rise to
the smallest regimes. Conversely, because x is increasing in θ (Proposition 2), the largest
regimes will be associated with being weakest upon their emergence.
Figure 8 illustrates these two forces. The right panel shows the statistical relation between
µt and λt. The left panel plots the marginal transition probability with respect to µt and λt.
The black line traces out the contour, (µ, λ) = (E[µ|λ], λ), of the relation shown in the right
precise decomposition of the overall decline in hazard rates into the effects of outsiders’ beliefs and statistical
selection.
21Revolts are more likely to succeed against pooling regimes, because reforms must be effective in reducing
the threat of revolt to be observed in equilibrium.
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Figure 8: Intuition for inverse J-curve. Left panel: marginal transition hazard E[haz|µ, λ]; solid black line
traces contour of (µ, λ) = (E[µ|λ], λ); red line depicts E[haz|λ]. Right panel: E[µ|λ]. All expectations are
computed at the stationary distribution.
panel, which closely approximates the exact J-curve E[haz|λ] (depicted in red).22 Relative to
regimes at the center of the autocracy-democracy spectrum, full-scale democracies (λ→ 1) are
stable due to a lack of opposition (dominating their perceived weakness). Extreme autocracies
(λ→ 0), on the other hand, are similarly uncontested due to their perceived stability implying
a low degree of coordination among outsiders.
Polarization of new regimes The logic behind the polarization of new regimes is straight-
forward. By Proposition 2, reforms are bounded below by ξ(θ¯t), since smaller reforms would
be ineffective in reducing revolutionary pressure. Conversely, revolts cannot grow too large,
since otherwise insiders would prefer to preempt them if they are vulnerable. In turn, outsiders
can infer the regime to be strong if it does not preempt a large revolt, making it unattractive
to join such a revolt in the first place. These considerations imply state-dependent bounds
λ¯ref(λt, Ft) and λ¯
rev(λt, Ft) such that for all θt ∈ [0, 1],
st ≤ λ¯rev(λt, Ft) and xt ≥ λ¯ref(λt, Ft).
22E[haz(E[µ|λ], λ)] is only approximate for two reasons. First, since the transition hazard is nonlinear in µt,
there is an approximation error associated with evaluating the hazard at the average µ for each λ as depicted
in the right panel (as opposed to computing the average hazard over the conditional distribution µ|λ). Second,
for our illustration, we have abstracted from the impact of σ2 on the transition hazard, by marginalizing the
hazard with respect to µ and λ, yielding another approximation error due to nonlinearity in σ. Comparing
the approximation with the exact J-curve (in red), it can be seen that the difference is small, so that the main
force behind the J-curve is indeed the statistical link between µ and λ shown in the right panel.
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Figure 9: Median reform and revolt conditional on originating regime.
While it is difficult to characterize these bounds fully analytically, it is possible to derive
somewhat more conservative bounds, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. λ¯reft > 1− (1− λ)M1t (θ¯t)/θ¯t and λ¯revt < (1− λ)M1t (θ¯t).
For instance, if outsiders have a uniform prior (Ft(θ) = θ), then M
1
t (θ¯t) = θ¯t/2, implying
λ¯reft > 1− (1− λt)/2 and λ¯revt < (1− λt)/2. For a more general illustration, consider Figure 9.
Here we plot the median revolt and reform, computed conditionally on λt, along with the
10th and 90th percentiles. The figure reveals that the polarization is strongest for transitions
originating in regimes towards the extremes of the autocracy-democracy spectrum. The
underlying logic is the flipside of the inverse J-curve: as extremely autocratic and democratic
regimes face small equilibrium threats, only few outsiders revolt, and consequentially only
regimes with large realizations of θt reform. This implies low levels of st and large values of
xt = ξ(θt).
Stationary distribution Finally, the bi-modal shape of the stationary distribution over
polities is a simple corollary to the polarization of new regimes, depicted in panels (e) and (f)
of Figure 7, and the inverse J-shape of the transition hazard in λ, as shown in panel (c).
6 Model Implications for Democratization
In this section, we study the implications of the model for the formation and survival of
democracies.
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Figure 10: The role of outsiders’ beliefs for transitions.
Outsiders’ sentiments and critical junctures In the model, the belief or “sentiment”
of outsiders is instrumental for creating a window of opportunity, in which democratization
is possible. Figure 10 illustrates the role of beliefs by plotting the predicted transition
hazards as a function of µt (for fixed values of λ and σ).
23 If outsiders perceive the regime as
sufficiently stable (µt is small), revolts constitute little threat and insiders abstain from reforms,
independently from the current realization of θt (i.e., θ¯(λt, Ft) = 1). If, by contrast, outsiders
perceive the regime as vulnerable, insiders anticipate them to coordinate on potentially large
revolts and are inclined to implement democratic reforms to preempt them. Because reforms
are effective in reducing revolutionary pressure, the revolt hazard is hump-shaped in µt, even
though the total transition hazard is increasing.
Interestingly, there is a region of intermediate values of µt, in which both transition hazards
are high. This is because insiders generally do not find it optimal to fully preempt revolts (see
the discussion in the previous section). Periods with intermediate values of µt thus constitute
“critical junctures”, during which small and random variations in current conditions determine
whether a regime ultimately implements democratic reforms, is replaced by an autocracy, or
remains unchanged (see Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2009 for empirical evidence in support of such
critical junctures).24 At the same time, because democracies and autocracies both stabilize
once they mature, any system that eventually emerges at the end of a critical juncture is
23Here, λ and σ are fixed at .1 and .0475, respectively, but the relationship is largely insensitive in their
precise values as long as λ is not too large. For large values of λ, all three hazards are significantly reduced in
their magnitude, while maintaining the same qualitative shape.
24Observe how marginal variations in λt and Ft can have large and persistent effects on λt+1 due to the
discontinuity of θ¯(λt, Ft) around θt. Conditionally on λt and Ft, outcomes are determined by the random
realizations of θt and ηt.
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likely to persist for a long time.
Illustration Figure 11 shows the dynamic responses to a counterfactual change in outsiders’
beliefs, illustrating the arrival of a critical juncture and subsequent political stabilization.
The time series is initialized at a “fully matured” autocracy, with λ0 = .1 and beliefs given
by their corresponding steady state values in the absence of any transition. As explained by
the low value of µ0, the initial reform and revolt hazards are close to zero. The time path
shows the response to a counterfactual change in outsiders’ beliefs at t = 2, resetting F2 to a
uniform prior.25
As seen in the bottom three panels, the belief shock at t = 2 leads to an immediate rise in
the reform hazard to roughly 20 percent and the revolt hazard to roughly 15 percent. Absent
any transition, µt drops in the sequel, causing a sharp decline in the reform hazard and a
moderate decline in the revolt hazard seen at t = 3 and t = 4. If the regime is overthrown, as
we assume it is at the end of t = 4, we see another increase in µt and the transition hazards.
Observe that this serial correlation of transition hazards implies that critical junctures often
consist of multiple transition events.
In our illustration, we consider two alternative time paths. The solid red path shows how
the autocracy stabilizes in the absence of further transitions, eventually leading to a reform
hazard of zero and a revolt hazard that converges to less than 1 percent after roughly 100
periods. The dashed blue path shows how the time path diverges if instead insiders implement
a democratic reform at t = 6, which occurs at a rate of 1.5 percent. Here, the inclusion of
a large fraction of the population into the regime leads to an immediate drop in the revolt
hazard to 2.7 percent, despite the strong increase in µt. Absent further transitions, the reform
hazard subsequently drops to zero and the revolt hazard eventually drops close to zero, albeit
at a much smaller rate than before.26
25In the model, large belief changes are induced by (small-probability) transition events. While this means
that the arrival of critical junctures is inextricably tied to regime changes, it is primarily the beliefs that are
important for the subsequent dynamics. The experiment conducted here is designed to illustrate the pure
impact of beliefs on transition probabilities by inducing the change in outsiders’ sentiments exogenously. While
absent in the estimated model, it would be straightforward to incorporate noisy signals into our framework
that would rationalize such belief shifts, capturing, for instance, sentiment shifts triggered by the deaths of
political leaders or by events in neighboring countries as in Buera, Monge-Naranjo and Primiceri (2011).
26The rate of stabilization is low due to the large value estimated for ρ, which governs the “usefulness” of
past information for forming beliefs regarding θt. As θt is fully revealed through reforms, a high value of ρ
implies that new information has little effect on outsiders’ beliefs in the aftermath of a reform. Only over time,
as the underlying state of θt changes (unobserved by outsiders) according to its law of motion, the precision
of outsiders’ beliefs eventually falls and beliefs are adjusted at a higher rate.
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Figure 11: Critical junctures and political stabilization. Solid red lines show the dynamic response to a
counterfactual change in outsiders’ beliefs at t = 2 and a subsequent revolt at t = 4. Dashed blue lines show
an alternative time path with an additional reform at t = 6. See the main text for further details.
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Figure 12: Cumulative reversal rate of young democracies.
Likelihood of successful democratization From the illustration in Figure 11 it is evident
that newly emerging democracies face a non-trivial probability of a regime reversal. This
is because outsiders excluded from the franchise extension learn the regime’s vulnerability,
leading to small but highly coordinated coup d’e´tats. To study the relevance of reversals more
broadly, we have simulated a time series of 10 Million observations from the estimated model.
Using this time path, we compute the reversal rate of young democracies (all new regimes
with λ ≥ .75) as a function of their maturity and the inclusiveness of the democracy at the
time of its formation.27 The results are presented in Figure 12. Critical for the success of
democratization is that the establishing reforms are comprehensive. Whereas the probability
that a democracy with an initial polity of λ ≤ .85 is overthrown in its first 25 periods is over
80 percent, the same probability drops to roughly 30 percent for democracies with an initial
polity between .85 and .95, and drops to 12 percent for democracies that are initially larger
than .95.
Are democracies absorbing? A related question is whether democracies are always bound
to fail (albeit with a small probability), or if there is the possibility of an absorbing regime.
In the model, transition hazards are strictly positive for any regime with λ < 1. Only a
perfectly inclusive democracy with λ = 1 is absorbing. In the estimated version of the model,
this is ruled out by our discrete approximation to λ, as λNλ = .9875 (see Footnote 16 for
details). But would an absorbing democracy eventually arise if we solved the model in a
continuous state space? The answer depends on the value of ξ(1), which determines the
27Here we do not count consecutive reforms as regime failures, so that the inclusiveness may change over
the life time of a democracy.
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largest democracy that is formed along the equilibrium path. Given the estimated value for α,
we have ξ(1) = .978, so that fully inclusive democracies indeed do not emerge in equilibrium,
even if we solve the model on a continuous polity space.
More generally, under which circumstances does an absorbing democracy emerge in
equilibrium? From the boundary condition for ξ, stated in Proposition 2, ξ(1) = 1 if
limx→1 V˜ I3 (1, 1, x) ≥ 0. Intuitively, this requires h(s(·, x)) to be sufficiently steep around x = 1
to compensate for the cost of reforms, u′(1). With the parametrization for u and h used in
the estimation, the condition reduces to a simple threshold in the elasticity of p with respect
to s.
Proposition 7. Let u(x) = 1+αu(1−x) and h(s) = sαh. Then, ξ(1) = 1 so that an absorbing
democracy with λ→ 1 emerges along the equilibrium path (a.s.) if and only if αh ≤ .5.
If the success rate of revolts is relatively inelastic in the number of supporters (αh ≤ .5),
outsiders’ coordination will not adjust strongly in response to reforms. To effectively reduce
revolutionary pressure, insiders therefore mainly rely on the extensive margin of reforms,
leading to (almost) absorbing democracies along the equilibrium path.28 By contrast, if
αh > .5, small groups of outsiders have a comparably low intensity of coordination and
excluding them does not pose severe threats. In this case, democracies are always bounded
away from λ = 1, so that reversals are observed with strictly positive probability against any
regime.
7 Discussion
This section relates the mechanism and predictions of our model to the existing literature on
political transitions and regime stability. We begin by highlighting the key components of
our model and how they relate to the literature. We then discuss alternative mechanism and
examine their ability to account for the empirical regularities motivating this paper.
28For a simple illustration, suppose there were no intensive margin of coordination; i.e., st = (1 − xt)γ¯
for a constant γ¯. Then limx→1 V˜ I3 (1, 1, x) = −αu + γ¯αh limx→1 s(1, x)αh−1, where the first term reflects the
cost of reforms and the second term the reduction in the revolt threat. Clearly, as x → 1 and s → 0, the
second term goes to ∞. Hence, absent any intensive margin, regimes with θ = 1 always prefer to establish a
fully inclusive regime. By contrast, if there is a (sufficiently elastic) intensive margin, then as x increases,
outsiders internalize the impact on p and coordinate less intensively. As a result, insiders face lower threats
for large (but not fully inclusive) regimes, reducing the marginal benefit, −∂h(s(·, x))/∂x, of implementing
fully inclusive reforms.
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7.1 Mechanism
Transitions in our model are shaped by three main features, which in combination explain
the empirical patterns documented in Section 2.
Coordinating revolts First, revolts are the outcome of a coordination game, where the
degree of equilibrium coordination is crucially shaped by the beliefs of outsiders. This is in
line with a long tradition in political science that views revolts as the result of individual
participation choices (e.g., Tullock, 1971; Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1989; Casper and Tyson,
2014), and links them to the arrival of new information (e.g., Lohmann, 1994; Chwe, 2000;
Bueno de Mesquita, 2010; Fearon, 2011; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011; Edmond, 2013).29
In the context of our model, the coordination game adds an intensive margin to revolting,
which together with asymmetric information prevents marginal reforms and helps explaining
the prevalence of revolts (fact 1). At the same time, as emphasized in Section 5, it is precisely
the drop in coordination along the intensive margin that is responsible for the stabilization of
mature and small regimes, helping us to explain facts 2 and 3. Finally, absent the intensive
margin, revolts would mechanically increase for small λt, leading to counterfactually large
revolts that are at odds with fact 4.
Preemptive reforms Second, we model reforms as means to credibly preempt a looming
revolt, as has been standard in the literature since the seminal works of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000b), Conley and Temini (2001), and Boix (2003).30 Vis-a`-vis these papers, a
distinguishing feature of reforms in our model is that they are of endogenous scope, which is
at the core of our quantitative exploration.
Asymmetric information Finally, we introduce asymmetric information, which is in-
strumental for the prevalence of revolts (fact 1), as well as the belief dynamics explaining
the stabilization of mature regimes (fact 2). While the dynamic implications are new, it is
relatively standard in the literature to introduce asymmetric information—and, hence, the
need for regimes to consider the signaling value of their politics—to generate costly conflict
along the equilibrium path (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a; Boix, 2003; Hirshleifer,
29In recent work, Aidt, Leon and Satchell (2017) empirically show that the spread of social unrest is
fundamentally caused by information flows. They also provide an extensive review of the empirical literature
regarding the role of coordination and information for the outbreak of social conflicts.
30Przeworski (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2014), and Aidt and Franck (2015) provide empirical evidence
suggesting that preemptive reforms are indeed an important driving force of democratization.
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Boldrin and Levine, 2009; Ellis and Fender, 2011).31
7.2 Predictions
This paper is first to develop a unified framework that can account for the transition patterns
documented in Section 2. In the following, we explain how each of the model’s predictions, in
isolation, relates to the existing literature and discuss alternative mechanism.
Co-occurrence of revolts and reforms There are three main reasons present in the
existing literature that explain co-existence between revolts and reforms along the equilibrium
path. First, as commented on above, revolts can be rationalized by asymmetric information,
which reduces the effectiveness of preemptive reforms (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a;
Ellis and Fender, 2011; Boix, 2003). Second, if benefits from holding on to power are sufficiently
large relative to the likelihood that a revolt succeeds, regimes may also find it optimal to
“gamble for their survival” as discussed in Section 5 (see also Besley and Persson, 2018). A third
reason, not present in our model, is limited commitment, which limits the compensation that
can be credibly offered to outsiders so that conflict may arise whenever the constraint becomes
binding (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010; Chassang and
Padro´ i Miquel, 2009). Also, a particularly stark variant of limited commitment arises when
elites have no means to appease potential rebels at all as in Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni
(2013).
A key difference between those works and this paper is that, with three exceptions, the
above papers do not allow for repeated transitions. The exceptions are Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001), Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni (2013) and Besley and Persson (2018), who allow for
random oscillations between autocratic and democratic regimes. However, as transitions are
exogenously restricted to occur between two regimes of fixed size, these papers mechanically
fix the revolt-reform ratio at unity32 in addition to fully predetermining transition outcomes,
preventing a quantitative analysis along the lines of this paper.
Transition hazards declining in maturity In our model, transition hazards decline in
regime maturity due to a reduced coordination among outsiders caused by learning.33 The
31Supporting the idea that politics may have a signaling value, Finkel, Gehlbach and Olsen (2015) present
empirical evidence that halfhearted reforms may fuel revolts by raising the expectations of success among
disenfranchised parts of the population.
32Besley and Persson (2018) consider two different modes of democratization. However, the relative
frequency of democratization to regime reversals is similarly fixed at unity.
33Our argument is related to Gallego and Pitchik (2004), who previously pointed out that autocratic leaders
with long tenure are likely to have low costs of averting coups. As noted earlier, such unobserved heterogeneity
33
literature has identified three alternative explanations, which in reduced form can be mapped
into our framework as exogenous variations in θ, γ and u.
Specifically, the first strand of the literature has argued that young regimes are intrinsically
more vulnerable compared to more mature ones (amounting to a drop in θ over time), because
emerging democracies first need to establish institutions to disempower military leaders
(Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010) whereas emerging autocracies first need to establish
institutions to effectively distribute economic rents to supporters (Svolik, 2009). Relatedly, a
second strand of the literature has argued that societies become increasingly supportive of the
current regime as political values adjust to political realities (Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni,
2013; Besley and Persson, 2018), which in our framework could be interpreted as a shift in
the distribution over political adjustment {γi,t}. Finally, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) offer
empirical evidence that economic growth in the aftermath of democratization leads to political
stabilization (see, however, Acemoglu et al., 2009). In the context of our framework, one
possible interpretation would be that democratization may create an institutional environment
supporting growth (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni,
2011), which over time increases the flow rents under democracy u(λ→ 1) relative to other
regime types, reducing the chance of regime reversals.34
One distinctive feature of our mechanism compared to these alternatives is that, with the
exception of Besley and Persson (2018), the above explanations are specific to either autocratic
or democratic consolidations. The belief-driven explanation in this paper, by contrast, applies
to all regime types, explaining the equally universal decline in hazards seen in the data (see
Appendix A.2 for details).
Inverse J-shape of transition hazards The observation that regime instability is inverse
J-shaped in inclusiveness goes back to Bremmer (2006). In his monograph, Bremmer explains
the “J-curve” with the ability of elites to control the information flow across society, which
immanently varies across different regime types. While information is highly restricted in
autocratic societies, inhibiting the coordination of revolts, it is precisely the free flow of
information that enables democratic institutions to peacefully resolve any looming conflict.
By contrast, intermediate regimes lack the institutions to preempt conflict whereas they are
also ill-equipped to contain the spread of subversive ideas.35 An alternative account is given
reinforces the belief dynamics emphasized in this paper through statistical selection.
34At the level of individual leaders, Ales, Maziero and Yared (2014) explain a decline in exit rates through
(self-enforcing) contracts, where re-elected leaders are those who get rewarded for compliant behavior, increasing
their flow utility and hence their propensity of future compliance.
35Relatedly, Gates et al. (2006) point out that it may not be the better access to information but the better
access to societal resources that facilitate political change in intermediate regimes. They note that, compared
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by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), who refer to the distribution of wealth among elites
across regime types to explain the J-curve. Specifically, Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue
that democratic elites are more wealthy than elites in other societies due to a more efficient
provision of public goods. Autocratic elites, by contrast, are similarly (albeit less) wealthy
due to an efficient distribution of rents. Core supporters of intermediate regimes, by contrast,
are lass wealthy, because they lack both efficiency in the provision of public goods and in
the distribution of rents. Accordingly, intermediate regimes are less supported, which is
interpreted as instability.
Both of these arguments essentially imply that a regime’s polity λ and its internal weak-
ness θ are inextricably linked. In contrast, our model explains the inverse “J-curve” through
an endogenous correlation between λ and θ. Through the lens of our model, the wealth of au-
tocratic elites and their tight grip on information flows that explain the stability of autocratic
systems in Bueno de Mesquita et al. and Bremmer may hence be the manifestation—instead
of the source—of their internal strength.
Polarization of new regimes A key novelty in this paper is the adoption of a continuous
polity space, which enables us to make predictions about outcome distributions. The closest
existing works are by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000),
Lizzeri and Persico (2004), and Llavador and Oxoby (2005), which endogenize the scope of
franchise extension but completely abstract from any regime dynamics that are at the center
of our contribution.
Our approach to endogenize the outcomes of political transitions also relates to a growing
literature on dynamic voting games, which studies stable equilibrium coalitions in rich state
spaces (e.g., Lagunoff, 2009; Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2008, 2012). In particular related
are Justman and Gradstein (1999); Gradstein (2007); Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2015),
who characterize transition paths leading to an (eventually) absorbing stable coalition.36
However, given their focus on the composition of coalitions, these papers typically do not pin
down a unique mode of transition between regimes, nor do they explicitly allow for violent
conflict along the equilibrium path.
Bimodal distribution To the best of our knowledge, this paper is first to make predictions
about the stationary distribution over regime types. The only other papers that we are aware
to heavily autocratic systems, the expansion of political participation gives “the opposition a better base from
which to demand further decentralization” (p. 895).
36See also, Jack and Lagunoff (2006) and Bai and Lagunoff (2011) for dynamic voting games that do not
necessarily lead to a stable coalition.
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of that can account for the bimodal distribution seen in the data, albeit mechanically, are
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Ticchi, Verdier and Vindigni (2013), in which regimes
oscillate randomly between autocracy and democracy.
8 Final Remarks
We have developed a quantitative theory of repeated political transitions based on the
evolution of beliefs regarding the regime’s strength. The model is distinguished from the
existing literature by its ability to generate various patterns of regime change in a unified
framework, including (possibly gradual) democratization processes, regime reversals against
both emerging and mature democracies, and power struggles amongst autocratic regimes. We
demonstrated the quantitative potential of the framework in a structural estimation targeting
several key moments from the data. The estimation results suggest that a simple model
based on the interplay between revolutionary pressure and preemptive reforms can generate a
process of political transitions that looks remarkably close to the data. Crucial for the close
fit is the presence of an intensive margin to revolting, which links revolutionary pressure to
the beliefs of outsiders regarding the regime’s strength.
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A Data and Additional Empirical Results
A.1 Data
Our data combines information from three sources. It covers all regime spells, as collected by Geddes,
Wright and Frantz (2014, GWF), that existed on January 1st of each year between 1946 and 2010 in
countries with more than one million inhabitants. GWF define regimes by “the rules that identify
the group from which leaders can come and [that] determine who influences leadership choice and
policy” (p. 314).37 Since GWF lists non-autocratic regimes only at a yearly frequency, we impute
the begin (end) dates for non-autocratic regimes from (i) the end (begin) dates of the previous (next)
regime and (ii) the begin date of the nearest Polity IV case within the same year. If (i) and (ii) yield
no match, we encode the begin dates as July 1st and the end dates as June 30th.
We measure the inclusiveness of regimes using the polity score, normalized between 0 and 1,
from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017), which ranks political regimes on a
21 point scale between autocratic and democratic. Specifically, we merge all polity spells listed in
the “Polity IV Polity-Cases” dataset to our sample of GWF regime spells, harmonizing start dates
on the basis of GWF spells whenever the start date of a polity case is within half a year (183 days)
of a GWF start date. Otherwise, we keep track of changing polity scores by subdividing GWF spells
into subspells.38
Third, we classify the GWF regime transitions primarily based on information provided by GWF
(variable “howend”). If the information in GWF is unavailable, we match the GWF transitions to
the nearest leader exit, taken from the Archigos database of political leaders by Goemans, Gleditsch
and Chiozza, 2009, within half a year, and use the variables on the types of exit and entry to label
the regime transitions. All violent regime transitions that are accompanied by popular protest, civil
war, or coups are classified as revolts. Peaceful transitions where political insiders either actively
change rules or newly allow for competitive elections or where there is no irregular leader change,
are labeled democratic reforms when accompanied by an increase in the polity score and autocratic
consolidations when accompanied by a decreasing polity score. All transitions influenced by foreign
governments are called foreign imposition. All remaining transitions are collected in the residual
37Note that by focusing on the ruling group, the definition allows for leadership succession within regimes (if the
identity of the ruling group remains unchanged) as well as regime changes without leadership replacement (if the
leader stays in power despite a change in the ruling group, e.g., via reforms). Similarly, the definition allows for
transitions that lead to a succession of regimes with similar scores of political inclusiveness.
38For some polity spells, Polity IV assigns “standardized authority scores” that do not fall into the autocracy-
democracy range. The score of -66 encodes foreign “interruption”, which we encode as missing. The polity scores of
-77 (“interregnum”) and -88 (“transition”) identify transitional episodes. We interpret GWF regime transitions that
occur during a transitional polity episode as the event defining the polity transition. Accordingly, transitional episodes
just before a GWF transition are encoded with the last non-transitional polity score within the old GWF regime, while
instances of transitional episodes just after a GWF transition are encoded via the first instance of a non-transitional
polity score within the new GWF regime. (If the new GWF regime does not include a non-transitional polity score,
we use the date of the next GWF transition to assign a date to the polity transition.) Finally, transitional episodes
within a given GWF regime spell are encoded using the subsequent polity score.
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Figure 13: Empirical transition hazards for revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel). Notes.—Hazards are the
baseline hazards estimated via (17), normalized relative to the unconditional hazard of revolts and reforms, respectively.
Shaded bands correspond to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the country level.
category other.
The resulting database covers 494 regime spells in 155 countries covering a total of 8843.87
country-years.
A.2 Estimation of Transition Hazards
Transition hazards and regime maturity The hazards, reported in Figure 1, are estimated by
differencing and smoothing over Nelson-Aalen estimates for the cumulative hazard rate, correcting
for left and right censoring. Here we explore the robustness of the findings controlling for polity and
region fixed effects.39 Specifically, we use a Cox proportional hazard model, with hazard rate
ps(τi,t|λi,t, ri) = h(τi,t) exp(f(λi,t) + ri) for s ∈ {reform, revolt}, (17)
where h(τi,t) is the baseline hazard, identified non-parametrically as a function of maturity τi,t, f is
a cubic spline in polity λi,t, and ri are the region fixed effects.
40 Figure 13 plots the baseline hazard
rates h for revolts and reforms, respectively. The results are similar to the ones in Figure 1, albeit
with slightly larger confidence intervals (the loss in precision is expected given the small number of
transition events and the large number of explanatory variables included in the current specification).
39Region definitions are based on the United Nations geoscheme, which we use to define 10 distinct regions in total
(Eastern Europe, Eastern and Central Asia, Middle America, Northern Africa and Arabic Peninsula, South America,
South-Eastern Asia, Western and Central Africa, Western Europe, Western Offshoots). Note that disentangling
the geographic controls further is likely to cause incidental parameters problems (biasing our estimators given their
nonlinearity), as already the region fixed effects turn out to be only weakly identified in our specifications.
40Following the recommendations of Harrell (2001), the cubic spline has five knots located at the 5th, 27.5th, 50th,
72.5th and 95th percentile of the distribution of polity (corresponding to the values 0.05, 0.15, 0.45, 0.90, and 1,
respectively).
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Figure 14: Empirical transition hazards for regimes on autocratic side (left panel) and democratic side (right
panel) of polity spectrum. Notes.—Hazards are normalized relative to the unconditional hazard for autocracies and
democracies, respectively. Shaded bands correspond to 80 percent bootstrap confidence intervals, clustered at the
country level.
Transition hazards by regime type Specification (17) already controls for the political system,
but continues to impose a baseline hazard h that is independent of λ. To explore inasmuch the
documented stabilization patterns equally apply to autocracies and democracies, we also compute
the hazard rate separately for regimes with λ ≤ .5 and λ > .5. The results for the combined revolt
and reform hazards are shown in Figure 14 (all results continue to hold if we separate the hazard by
both origin and mode of transition). It is evident that the stabilization equally applies to regimes on
the autocratic and democratic side of the spectrum.
Hazard ratios of political systems To estimate the relation between political inclusiveness and
transition hazards, reported in Figure 2, we re-estimate (17) for the combined failures due to reforms
and revolts. The estimated relationship is given by the cubic spline f .
B Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Effectiveness of Reforms
Here we show formally that outsiders have no incentives to ever refuse becoming enfranchised. The
argument also implies that agents born as insiders never choose to rebel if given the choice. To show
this, we need to show that
(1− p(·, xt))u(xt) ≥ max
{
θˆtψ(st), γit
}
.
A lower bound on the utility as an enfranchised insider is u(1), because xt = 1 is in the choice
set of insiders; i.e., (1 − p(·, xt))u(xt) ≥ (1 − p(·, 1))u(1) = u(1). When the best outside option
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is to not support a revolt, the result trivially follows from u(1) ≥ γit for all i and t. For the
case, where an outsider’s best outside option is to revolt, an upper bound on the utility is given
by ψ(1) = h(1)u(1), because by Assumption 1 revolts are more rewarding when they have more
supporters; i.e., θˆtψ(st) ≤ ψ(st) ≤ ψ(1). Noting that h(1) ≤ 1 gives the result.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Using (7), we can rewrite (8) as
pi(s, x, θˆ) ≡ s−min{f(s, (1− x)θˆ), 1− x} = 0 (18)
for
f(s, y) ≡ yψ(s).
Recall that u(1) = 1 and h(·) ∈ [0, 1]. By Assumption 1, f is therefore increasing and (weakly)
concave in both arguments. Accordingly, f(s, y) ≤ y, allowing us to drop the min-operator from
(18).
As f(0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1], there always exists a solution to (18) at s = 0. We distinguish
two cases. First, let y = 0 (i.e,. when θˆ = 0 or x = 1). Then f(s, y) = 0 for all s, so that s = 0 is
the unique stable solution to (18).
Second, let y > 0. By Assumption 1, f1(0, y) > 1, so that s = 0 is unstable.
41 We now show the
existence of a unique stable fixed point s > 0. Specifically, f1(0, y) > 1 implies that f(s˜, y) > s˜ for
s˜↘ 0 and any y > 0. On the other hand, as noted above, f(s˜, y) ≤ y ≤ s˜ for s˜↗ 1. Continuity of
ψ (and thus of f), therefore imply the existence of a fixed point s∗ > 0. Monotonicity and concavity
of f further imply that s∗ is unique on (0, 1]. Clearly, it must hold f1(s∗, y) < 1, and so s∗ is stable.
The above arguments establish that st is uniquely determined by a (time-invariant) function
s : (θˆt, xt) 7→ st. It remains to be shown that ∂s/∂θˆt ≥ 0 and ∂s/∂xt ≤ 0. Implicit differentiation on
(18) implies that
∂s
∂xt
= −θˆt ψ(st)×
(
∂pi
∂st
)−1
and
∂s
∂θˆt
= (1− xt)ψ(st)×
(
∂pi
∂st
)−1
,
where
∂pi
∂st
= −(1− xt) ∂γ¯
∂st
+ 1.
Since ψ is bounded by ψ(1) = 1, (8) implies that limθˆt→0 st = limxt→1 st = 0, and therefore the case
where θˆt = 0 or xt = 1 is a limiting case of θˆt 6= 0 and xt 6= 1. From the implicit function theorem it
41I.e., iteratively best responding to any perceived sˆ = ε > 0 leads to a distinct equilibrium s∗ > 0 described in the
following.
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then follows that s is differentiable on its whole support. As noted above, f1(st, y) < 1, implying
γ¯2(θˆt, st) < (1 − xt)−1 at st = s∗. Thus ∂pit/∂st > 0 for all (θˆt, xt) ∈ Θ × [0, 1], which yields the
desired results.
Finally, while we developed the proof for pure strategies above, it is easy to see that the
proposition generalizes to mixed strategies. By the law of large numbers, in any mixed strategy
equilibrium, beliefs about s are of zero variance and, hence, the arguments above apply, implying
that all outsiders, except a zero mass i with γi = γ¯(st), strictly prefer φi = 0 or φi = 1. We conclude
that there is no scope for (nondegenerate) mixed best responses.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas. To simplify notation, in what follows we drop (λt, Ft) as ar-
guments of x, θˆ and θ¯ where no confusion arises. Furthermore, we use V˜ I(θ, θˆ, x) ≡ V I(θh(s(θˆ, x)), x) =
(1−θh(s(θˆ, x)))u(x) to denote insider’s expected indirect utility, where s is as given by Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. x is weakly increasing in θt.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) < x(θ′) for θ′ < θ′′. Let x′ ≡ x(θ′), x′′ ≡ x(θ′′), u′ ≡ u(x′),
u′′ ≡ u(x′′), h′ ≡ h(s(θˆ(x′), x′)), and h′′ ≡ h(s(θˆ(x′′), x′′)). Optimality of x′ then requires that
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′), implying u′h′ − u′′h′′ ≤ (u′ − u′′)/θ′ < (u′ − u′′)/θ′′, where the
last inequality follows from θ′ < θ′′ and u′ < u′′. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) implies
that V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′), contradicting optimality of x′′ for θ′′.
Lemma 2. Suppose x is discontinuous at θ′, and define x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′+ε) and x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ′+ε).
Then for any x′ ∈ (x−, x+), the only beliefs consistent with the D1 criterion are θˆ(x′) = θ′.
Proof. Let θ′′ > θ′, and let x′′ ≡ x(θ′′). Optimality of x′′ then requires that V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≥
V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) and, thus for any θ˜,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) implies that
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Moreover, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) implies that
V˜ I(θ′, θ˜, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Hence, if V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) = V ∗(θ′′), then V˜ I(θ′, θ˜, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) = V ∗(θ′).
Therefore, Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if θ
′′ > θ′, ruling out θˆ(x′) > θ′ by the D1 criterion.42
42The D1 criterion requires that beliefs are attributed to the state in which a deviation to x′ is attractive for the
largest set of possible inferences about the regime’s vulnerability. Formally, let V ∗(θ) ≡ E{V I(η, x∗(θ, λ))|θ} be the
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A similar argument establishes that Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if θ
′′ < θ′ and, thus, the D1
criterion requires that θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ (x−, x+).
Lemma 3. There exists θ¯t > 0, such that xt = λt for all θt ≤ θ¯t. Moreover, x(θ′′) > x(θ′) > λt + µ
for all θ′′ > θ′ > θ¯t and some µ > 0.
Proof. First, consider the existence of a connected pool at xt = λt. Because for θt = 0, xt = λt
dominates all xt > λt, we have that x(0) = λt. It follows that there exists a pool at xt = λt, because
otherwise θˆ(λt) = 0 and, therefore, p(·, s(θˆ(λt), λt)) = 0, contradicting optimality of x(θ) > λt for all
θ > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 1, x is increasing, implying that any pool must be connected. This
proves the first part of the claim.
Now consider x(θ′′) > x(θ′) for all θ′′ > θ′ > θ¯t and suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) ≤ x(θ′)
for some θ′′ > θ′. Since x is increasing, it follows that x(θ) = x+ for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] and some
x+ > λt. W.l.o.g. assume that θ
′ is the lowest state in this pool. Then Bayesian updating implies
that θ+ ≡ θˆ(x+) ≥ EFt{θt|θ′′ ≥ θt ≥ θ′} > θ′ and, therefore, V˜ I(θ′, θ−, x+) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+)
for all θ− ≤ θ′. Hence, because θ′ prefers x+ over x(θ−), it must be that x(θ−) 6= x+ for all
θ− ≤ θ′ and, hence, x(θ−) < x+ by Lemma 1. Accordingly, let x− ≡ maxθ−≤θ′ x(θ−). Then from
continuity of V˜ I and θ+ > θ′ it follows that there exists an off-equilibrium reform x′ ∈ (x−, x+) with
V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+). Hence, to prevent θ′ from choosing x′ it must be that θˆ(λt, x′, Ft) > θ′.
However, from Lemma 2 we have that θˆ(x′) = θ′, a contradiction.
Finally, to see why there must be a jump-discontinuity at θ¯t note that V˜
I(θ¯t,EFt{θt|θt ≤ θ¯t}, λt) =
V˜ I(θ¯t, θ¯t, x(θ¯t)); otherwise, there necessarily exists a θ in the neighborhood of θ¯t with a profitable
deviation to either λt or x(θ¯t). From the continuity of V˜
I and the non-marginal change in beliefs
from EFt{θt|θt ≤ θ¯t} to θ¯t it follows that x(θ¯t) > λt + µ for all λt and some µ > 0.
Lemma 4. x is continuous and differentiable in θt on (θ¯t, 1].
Proof. Consider continuity first and suppose to the contrary that x has a discontinuity at θ′ ∈ (θ¯t, 1).
By Lemma 1, x is monotonically increasing in θt. Hence, because x is defined on an interval, it
follows that for any discontinuity θ′, x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′) and x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ′) exist, and that x is
differentiable on (θ′ − ε, θ′) and (θ′, θ′ + ε) for some ε > 0. Moreover, from Lemmas 2 and 3 it
follows that in equilibrium θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ [x−, x+]. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) = V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x+), since
otherwise there necessarily exists a θ in the neighborhood of θ′ with a profitable deviation to either x−
or x+. Accordingly, optimality of x(θ′) requires V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) and, thus, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−)
must be weakly decreasing in x. Therefore, ∂V˜ I/∂θˆt < 0 and limε′↓0 ∂θˆ(x− − ε′)/∂xt > 0 (following
from Lemma 3) imply that limε′↓0 ∂V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x−− ε′), x−− ε′)/∂xt < 0. Hence, a profitable deviation
to x− − ε′ exists for some ε′ > 0, contradicting optimality of x(θ′).
insiders’ expected payoff in state θ under a candidate equilibrium x∗. Then the D1 criterion restricts beliefs for
off-equilibrium events x′ to states θ′ that maximizes Dθ′,x′ = {θˆ : E{V I(η, x′)|θ′, s = s(θˆ, x′)} ≥ V ∗(θ′)} in the sense
that there is no θ′′ such that Dθ′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′′,x′ .
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We establish differentiability by applying the proof strategy for Proposition 2 in Mailath (1987).
Let g(θ, θˆ, x) ≡ V˜ I(θ, θˆ, x)− V˜ I(θ, θ′, x(θ′)), for a given θ′ > θ¯t, and let θ′′ > θ′. Then, optimality of
x(θ′) implies g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≤ 0, and optimality of x(θ′′) implies that g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ 0. Letting
a = (αθ′ + (1− α)θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), for some α ∈ [0, 1] this implies
0 ≥ g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ −g1(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′))(θ′′ − θ′)− 12g11(a)(θ′′ − θ′)2,
where the second inequality follows from first-order Taylor expanding g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around
(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) and rearranging the expanded terms using the latter optimality condition. Expanding
further g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around (θ′, θ′, x(θ′)), using the mean value theorem on g1(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), and
noting that g(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = g1(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = 0, these inequalities can be written as
0 ≥ g2(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) + x(θ
′′)− x(θ′)
θ′′ − θ′ × [g3(θ
′, θ′, x(θ′))
+ 12g33(b(β))(x(θ
′′)− x(θ′)) + g23(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)] + 12g22(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)
≥ −[g12(b(β′)) + 12g11(a)](θ′′ − θ′)− g13(b(β′))(x(θ′′)− x(θ′)),
for b(β) = (θ′, βθ′ + (1− β)θ′′, βx(θ′) + (1− β)x(θ′′)) and some β, β′ ∈ [0, 1]. Because V˜ I is twice
differentiable, all the derivatives of g are finite. Moreover, continuity of x implies that x(θ′′)→ x(θ′)
as θ′′ → θ′ and, therefore, for θ′′ → θ′,
0 ≥ g2(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) + lim
θ′′→θ′
x(θ′′)− x(θ′)
θ′′ − θ′ g3(θ
′, θ′, x(θ′)) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3, x and, hence, θˆ are strictly increasing for all θ ≥ θ¯(λt, Ft). Arguing similarly as we
did to show continuity, optimality of x, therefore, requires that g3 = V˜
I
3 (θ, θ, x) 6= 0 and, hence, the
limit of (x(θ′′)− x(θ′))/(θ′′ − θ′) is well defined, yielding
dx
dθ
= − V˜
I
2 (θ, θ, x)
V˜ I3 (θ, θ, x)
. (19)
Lemma 5. x(θt) = ξ(θt) for all θt > θ¯t, where ξ is unique and ∂ξ/∂θt > 0.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have that ξ is differentiable, and by Lemma 3, ∂ξ/∂θt > 0. We thus only
need to show that ξ is unique. By the proof to Lemma 4, dx/dθt is pinned down by the partial
differential equation (19), which must hold for all θt > θ¯t. Moreover, whenever θ¯t < 1, in equilibrium
θˆ(x(1)) = 1 and, therefore, it obviously must hold that x(1) = arg maxxt V˜
I(1, 1, xt), providing a
boundary condition for (19). Because V˜ I is independent of (λt, Ft), it follows that x(θt) is uniquely
characterized by a function, i.e., ξ : θt 7→ xt, for all θt > θ¯t.
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Lemma 6. θ¯(λt, Ft) is unique.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that θ¯(λt, Ft) is not unique. Then there exist θ¯
′′ > θ¯′, defining
two distinct equilibria for a given λt. By Lemma 5, there is a unique ξ(θ) characterizing reforms
outside the pool for both equilibria. Optimality for type θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯′′) then requires V˜ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≥
V˜ I(θ,EFt{θt|θt ≤ θ¯′}, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ¯′, and V˜ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≤ V˜ I(θ,EFt{θt|θt ≤
θ¯′′}, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ¯′′. However, V˜ I(θ,EFt{θt|θt ≤ θ¯′}, λt) > V˜ I(θ,EFt{θt|θt ≤
θ¯′′}, λt), a contradiction.
This establishes uniqueness of x(θt, λt, Ft), with all properties given by Lemmas 3 and 5, and
the corresponding beliefs θˆ(λt, xt, Ft) following from Lemma 2 and Bayesian updating. Again, for
the purpose of clarity we have established this proposition by focusing on pure strategy equilibria.
In the following we outline how the proof generalizes to mixed strategy equilibria; a detailed version
of these steps can be attained from the authors on request.
Replicating the proof of Lemma 1, it is trivial to show that if V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) = V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′),
then V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) for all θ′ < θ′′ and x′ < x′′. It follows that (i) supports,
X (θ), are non-overlapping, and (ii) minX (θ′′) ≥ maxX (θ′). Moreover, noting that x˜(θ) ≡ maxX (θ)
has a jump-discontinuity if and only if type θ mixes in a non-degenerate way, (ii) further implies that
there can be only finitely many types that mix on the closed interval [0, 1]. The logic of Lemmas 2,
3, and 4 then apply, ruling out any jumps of x˜ on [θ¯(λt, Ft), 1]. This leads to the conclusion that
at most a mass zero of types (i.e., θt = θ¯(λt, Ft)) could possibly mix in any equilibrium (with no
impact on θˆ) and, thus, there is no need to consider any non-degenerate mixed strategies.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Case (i) follows trivial, as here the state is revealed through insiders’ reforms. Cases (ii) and (iii) are
a straightforward application of Bayes’ law. In particular, for any ϑ ≤ θ¯t, we get
F˜t(ϑ|ηt = 1, xt = λt) =
∫ ϑ
0 p(θ, s)dFt(θ)∫ θ¯t
0 p(θ, s)dFt(θ)
=
Ft(ϑ)
Ft(θ¯t)
M1t (ϑ)
M1t (θ¯t)
and
F˜t(ϑ|ηt = 0, xt = λt) =
∫ ϑ
0 (1− p(θ, st))dFt(θ)∫ θ¯t
0 (1− p(θ, st))dFt(θ)
=
Ft(ϑ)
Ft(θ¯t)
· 1− h(st)M
1
t (ϑ)
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
.
Note that by letting
∫
dF denote the Lebesgue integral, the derivation applies for arbitrary, not
necessarily continuous, probability measures Ft.
B.5 Derivation of Equations (11) and (12)
In case (i), Fˆt|(xt > λt) is a single mass point on θt, so trivially µ˜t = θt and σ˜2t = 0.
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Consider, case (ii) next. From Proposition 3, we have that for all θ ≤ θ¯t,
dF˜t(θ) =
1
Ft(θ¯t)M1t (θ¯t)
d
(
Ft(θ)M
1
t (θ)
)
where, using the definition of M1t ,
d
(
Ft(θ)M
1
t (θ)
)
= d
∫ θ
0
ϑdFt(ϑ) = θdFt(θ).
Computing the i-the raw moment of F˜t, we have
EF˜t{θi|θ ≤ θ¯t} =
1
Ft(θ¯t)M1t (θ¯t)
∫ θ¯t
0
θi+1dFt(θ)
=
M i+1t (θ¯)
M1t (θ¯)
and, accordingly,
µ˜t|(ηt = 1, xt = λt) = M
2
t (θ¯)
M1t (θ¯)
σ˜2t |(ηt = 1, xt = λt) =
M3t (θ¯)
M1t (θ¯)
− µ˜2t .
Case (iii) is analyzed analogously. For all θ ≤ θ¯t, the probability measure is given by
dF˜t(θ) =
1
Ft(θ¯t)
(
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
)d(Ft(θ) (1− h(st)M1t (θ)))
where
d
(
Ft(θ)
(
1− h(st)M1t (θ)
))
= dFt(θ)− h(st)d
∫ θ
0
ϑdFt(ϑ) = (1− θh(st))dFt(θ).
The i-th raw moment is thus given by
EF˜t{θi|θ ≤ θ¯t} =
1
Ft(θ¯t)
(
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
) ∫ θ¯t
0
(θi − θi+1h(st))dFt(θ)
=
M it (θ¯t)− h(st)M i+1t (θ¯t)
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
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and, hence,
µ˜t|(ηt = 0, xt = λt) = M
1
t (θ¯t)− h(st)M2t (θ¯t)
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
σ˜2t |(ηt = 0, xt = λt) =
M2t (θ¯t)− h(st)M3t (θ¯t)
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
− µ˜2t .
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition is a straightforward corollary to Propositions 1–3: From Proposition 1 and 2, there
exists a unique mapping from St to {{φit}i∈[0,1], st, xt}, which further implies a unique (stochastic)
mapping from St to ηt. Proposition 3, in turn, implies that there exists a unique mapping from
(St, xt, ηt) to St+1. As St is purely-backward looking, we conclude that for any S0 there exists a
unique stochastic equilibrium path.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Given Pr(θt = θt−1) → 1, we have that θ0 = θ1 = · · · ≡ θ almost surely. We prove two versions
of the proposition. Our preferred version amounts to the case where θ is fixed across time, but is
unobserved by the statistician. To estimate transition hazards, the statistician treats θ as hidden
state and refines his estimate for θ based on the realizations of (xt, st, ηt). Accordingly, in our
preferred version of the proposition, the statistical probability measure at date t coincides with
outsiders’ prior Ft. However, the proposition also holds conditional on θ0. To show this, we first
prove the result for a fixed θ0, and then derive the more general result where θ0 is treated as hidden
state as a corollary.
Step 1 (fixed θ0). Fix some (θ0, λ0, F0), and let θ¯0 define the pooling threshold as in Proposition 2.
We tacitly assume θ0 < θ¯0, so that there is indeed no reform at t = 0.
Consider any t > 0 and suppose there was no transition until until t−1. From Pr(θt = θt−1)→ 1,
Ft(θ¯t−1) = F˜t−1(θ¯t−1). Proposition 3 then implies
Ft(θ¯t−1) = F˜t−1(θ¯t−1) = 1, (20)
so that
M1t (θ¯t−1) = EFt{θ|θ ≤ θ¯t−1} = EFt{θ}. (21)
Moreover, from (11),
EFt{θ} =
M2t−1(θ¯t−1)
M1t−1(θ¯t−1)
. (22)
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Combining (21) and (22) and noting that VarFt [θ|θ ≤ ϑ] = M2t (ϑ)− [M1t (ϑ)]2 > 0 implies M2t (ϑ) >
[M1t (ϑ)]
2, we have
M1t (θ¯t−1) =
M1t−1(θ¯t−1)− h(st−1)M2t−1(θ¯t−1)
1− h(st−1)M1t−1(θ¯t−1)
< M1t−1(θ¯t−1). (23)
Further noting that from (20), M1t (θ¯t−1) = M1t (θ¯t) for all θ¯t ≥ θ¯t−1, we conclude that
hazrevt = θ0h(s(M
1
t (θ¯t), λ0)) < θ0h(s(M
1
t−1(θ¯t−1), λ0)) = haz
rev
t−1 (24)
if θ¯t ≥ θ¯t−1.
To complete the proof of the first step, we need to show that θ¯t ≥ θ¯t−1, implying that (24) indeed
holds, and further implying that
hazreft ≤ Pr(θ0 ≥ θ¯t) = 0.
To see that this is true, note that from (24),
V˜ I(θ¯t−1, θˆ(λ0, λ0, Ft), λ) > V˜ I(θ¯t−1, θˆ(λ0, λ0, Ft−1), λ),
implying that the right-hand side of condition (9) is increased from t to t− 1 at θ¯ = θ¯t−1. As the
left-hand side of (9) is constant in t, it thus must hold that θ¯t > θ¯t−1.
Step 2 (θ0 is a hidden state) Now suppose that the statistician does not know the realization of
θ0. Instead he or she filters through the realized history of the economy, summarized by (xτ , sτ , ητ )τ<t,
to compute a probability measure for θ0 and the corresponding transition hazards. As the realized
history coincides with outsiders’ information set, the statistical probability measure is simply given
by Ft. Specifically, transition hazards at date t are given by
hazreft =
∫ 1
θ¯t
(1− θh(s(θ, ξ(θ)))) dFt(θ)
hazrevt =
∫ θ¯t
0
θh(s(M1t (θ¯t), λ0)) dFt(θ) +
∫ 1
θ¯t
θh(s(θ, ξ(θ))) dFt(θ).
Step 1 immediately implies that for all t > 0, in the absence of any prior transition,
hazreft = 0
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and
hazrevt =
∫ θ¯t
0
θh(s(M1t (θ¯t), λ0)) dFt(θ)
= h(s(M1t (θ¯t), λ0)) ·M1t (θ¯t).
To conclude the proof, note that from above, M1t (θ¯t) < M
1
t−1(θ¯t−1), so that haz
rev
t is again strictly
decreasing in t as both factors are decreasing in M1t (θ¯t). Intuitively, the first factor captures the
decline in the revolt-hazard due to outsiders perceiving the regime as more stable (leading to a fall
in st over time). The second term captures the uncertainty by the statistician, which similarly to
outsiders, now also infers that the regime is more stable over time, further reducing the revolt-hazard
over time compared to the fixed θ0-case above.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Bounding reforms Insiders’ optimality condition implies that ξ(θ¯t) is effective in reducing
revolutionary pressure; i.e.,
s(θ¯t, ξ(θ¯t)) < s(M
1
t (θ¯t), λt). (25)
From the proof of Proposition 1, we can write s(θˆ, x) = s¯(ω) with ω = (1 − x)θˆ and s¯′ > 0.
Accordingly, (25) implies
(1− ξ(θ¯t))θ¯t < (1− λt)M1t (θ¯t),
and so
xt ≥ ξ(θ¯t) > 1− (1− λt)M
1
t (θ¯t)
θ¯t
≡ λ¯reft .
Bounding revolts From (7) and (8), st solves the fixed-point equation
st = ωtψ(st) (26)
with ωt = (1− xt)θˆt. Let ω′ > ω and, correspondingly, let s′ > s as in (26). Then
s = ωψ (s) < ωψ(s′) =
ω
ω′
s′. (27)
Evaluating (27) for ω = (1− λt)M1t (θ¯t) and ω′ = (1− λt)θ¯t > ω yields
s(M1t (θ¯t), λt) <
M1t (θ¯t)
θ¯t
s(θ¯t, λt). (28)
Similarly, evaluating (27) for ω = (1− λt)θ¯t and ω′ = 1, we have
s(θ¯t, λt) < (1− λt)θ¯ts(1, 0) ≤ (1− λt)θ¯t. (29)
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Combining (28) and (29), and recalling that optimization by insiders requires that st is weakly below
s(M1t (θ¯t), λt), yields
st ≤ s(M1t (θ¯t), λt) < (1− λt)M1t (θ¯t) ≡ λ¯revt .
B.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating V˜ I with respect to its third argument, we obtain
lim
x→1
V˜ I3 (1, 1, x) = −αu − lim
x→1
αhs(1, x)
αh−1s2(1, x),
or, substituting for s2 as computed in the proof to Proposition 1 and observing that x→ 1 implies
s(1, x)→ 0,
lim
x→1
V˜ I3 (1, 1, x) = −αu + lim
x→1
αhs(1, x)
2αh−1 1 + αu
1− (1 + αu)αh 1−xs(1,x)1−αh
. (30)
Using L’Hospital’s Rule, we get after some algebra
lim
x→1
1− x
s(1, x)1−αh
=
1
(1− αh)(1 + αu) −
αh
1− αh limx→1
1− x
s(1, x)1−αh
,
which has a unique fixed point at
lim
x→1
1− x
s(1, x)1−αh
=
1
1 + αu
.
Substituting back into (30), we have that ξ(1) = 1 if and only if
lim
x→1
s(1, x)2αh−1 ≥ αu
1 + αu
1− αh
αh
.
Note that the right side of the inequality is strictly between zero and unity, as 0 < αu ≤ αh given
the properties imposed on u and h. The left side of the inequality goes to zero for all αh > .5, goes
to ∞ for all αh < .5, and is constant at unity for αh = .5. We conclude that ξ(1) = 1 if and only if
αh ≤ .5, implying that a regime with λ→ 1 emerges (almost surely) under the same conditions (as
G has full support on [0, 1]).
C Numerical Implementation
This section describes the algorithm used to solve and estimate the model.
Solution to the model We first describe how to solve the model for a given parametrization ω.
The solution is simplified by the block-recursivity of the overlapping generations structure, which
let’s us break down the algorithm into three successive steps.
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Step 1 (coordination problem). We solve the functional fixed-point (8) for s : (θˆ, x) 7→ s using a
spline collocation. Noting that (1− x)γ¯(θˆ, s) = yh(s)u(s) with y = (1− x)θˆ, we can reduce s to a
univariate function s¯ : y 7→ s. We parametrize s¯ using a septic spline with 34 interior break points,
with parameters chosen to solve (8) on a fine grid on [0, 1]. The procedure gives a very accurate
approximation to s (evaluating (8) on an equally-spaced grid with 1000 points on [0, 1], yields a
maximal error below 5 · 10−7).
Step 2 (signaling problem). The solution to the signaling problem characterized by Proposition 2
breaks down in two substeps. (i) Given s, we can solve for ξ using a standard solver for ordinary
differential equations. (ii) Given s and ξ, θ¯ can be solved using a standard bisection method on [0, 1].
Step 3 (stationary distribution). We approximate the stationary distribution on a (Nλ×Nµ×Nσ)-
point grid for (λ, µ, σ) with Nλ = 21, Nµ = 20, Nσ = 20 (see the main body of the paper for more
details). The laws of motion are given by (2), (13) and (14), with
M it (ϑ) = B(ϑ, at + i, bt)/B(ϑ, a, b)
where B is the incomplete Beta function with shape parameters
at = µt
(
µt(1− µt)
σ2t
− 1
)
bt = (1− µt)
(
µt(1− µt)
σ2t
− 1
)
. (31)
To compute the transition matrix Q(λt+1, µt+1, σt+1|λt, µt, σt), we first solve the generation game
conditional on (θt, λt, µt, σt) and integrate out θt using Ft as probability measure (see Footnote 15 for
details). For each (λt+1, µt+1, σt+1), we then discretize the resulting transition probabilities to the
eight adjacent grid-points, {λi, λi+i}×{µi, µi+1}×{σi, σi+1}, assigning probabilities proportionately
to their inverse Euclidean distance to the respective corners of the cube. Once we have Q, we
first verify that there exist a single recurrent class, consisting of 3322 states at our estimate (the
remainder 5078 states are not reached along the equilibrium path). Finally, we iterate on Q until
convergence, yielding the unique stationary distribution.
On a Thinkpad X230 with a i5-3230M, the whole process takes about 5 seconds to complete.
Estimation We use a combination of global and local minimization tools to solve (15). Specifically,
we first use a particle swarm algorithm with 20 chains of 16 particles each to conduct a preliminary
global search. The particles are initialized using scrambled Sobol quasi-random numbers, and evolve
completely independent across the 20 chains. After running the particle swarm algorithm for up to
200 iterations, we then run 20 local optimizer, initialized at the 20 minima attained across the 16
particles by each of the 20 chains. Our estimator is the minimum across the 20 chains.
The process converged to the exact same estimate for the top 9 out of 20 chains. On two
Xeon E5-2630 v4 processors (with 20 physical cores), the whole estimation took about 4.5 hours to
complete.
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D Accurateness of Belief Approximation
For the estimation of the model, we track outsiders’ beliefs over time by approximating the one-step
ahead projection from the posterior F˜t (which we compute exactly as in Proposition 3) to the prior
Ft+1 using a Beta distribution with moments matching (13) and (14). In this section, we explore the
accurateness of this approximation. Overall, we find that the approximation of Ft+1 is remarkably
exact, tracing the true prior almost perfectly.
D.1 Beliefs after reforms
After an attempted or successful reform (xt > λt, ηt ∈ {0, 1}), the current state of the regime is fully
revealed. Accordingly, the exact prior at t+ 1 is truncated normal with mean ρθt + µ and variance
σ2 . For any interior ϑ ∈ (0, 1), the pdf is given by
ft+1(ϑ) = φρθt+µ,σ2 (ϑ),
where φµ,σ2 denotes the density of a (µ, σ
2)-normal distribution. At the boundaries, ϑ ∈ {0, 1}, Ft+1
has mass points corresponding to the tails of ft+1.
By contrast, the Beta approximation is given by
fapproxt+1 (ϑ) = βρθt+µ,σ2 (ϑ),
where βµ,σ2 denotes the density of a Beta distribution with mean µ and variance σ
2 (implemented
by shape parameters as in (31)).
Panel (a) of Figure 15 compares ft+1 and f
approx
t+1 for three different values of θt. Specifically,
the values of θt are set to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the distribution over θt conditional
on there being a reform at t. In all three cases, the approximation traces the exact shape of ft+1
almost perfectly, despite being marginally skewed for the 90th percentile of θt. Moreover, because
fapproxt+1 integrates to unity on (0, 1), the close fit in the interior also implies that ft+1 integrates to
approximately unity on (0, 1), so that that the residual mass distributed as mass points on {0, 1} is
negligible.
D.2 Beliefs after revolts against pooling regimes
Consider next the case where the regime does not attempt any reform and is overthrown by a revolt.
From Proposition 3, the posterior density f˜t = F˜
′ is given by
f˜ t(ϑ) =
1
Ft(θ¯t)
ϑF ′t(ϑ)
M1t (θ¯t)
.
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(a) Beliefs after reforms
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(b) Beliefs after revolts against pooling regimes
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(c) Beliefs after no transition
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Figure 15: Accurateness of belief approximation. Black dotted lines are exact prior beliefs computed as in (10). Solid
red lines approximate the one-step ahead projection using Beta-distributions with their first two moments matching
(13) and (14). Top panel compares ft+1 with f
approx
t+1 for xt > λt, ηt ∈ {0, 1} and θt set to the 10th, 50th and 90th
percentile of Pt(θt|xt > λt). Middle and bottom panels compare ft+1 with fapproxt+1 for xt = λt, ηt = 1 (middle panel)
and ηt = 1 (bottom panel), µt set to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of Pt(µt|xt = λt, ηt), and λt and σt are set
to the conditional (on µt) medians.
56
Substituting f˜t into (10), we obtain ft+1, which for any interior ϑ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
ft+1(ϑ) =
1
Ft(θ¯t)
1
M1t (θ¯t)
∫ ∞
−∞
φµ,σ2 (ϑ− ρθ)θft(θ) dθ
where ft is the prior density at t. The Beta approximation is given by
fapproxt+1 (ϑ) = βρµ˜t+µ,ρ2σ˜2t+σ2 (ϑ),
with µ˜t and σ˜
2
t as in (11) and (12).
Panel (b) of Figure 15 compares ft+1 with its approximation f
approx
t+1 for three different states
St. Specifically, we set µt to its 10th, 50th and 90th percentile conditional there being no reform
and a successful revolt at t (xt = λt, ηt = 1). The value of σ
2
t is fixed at the associated median
(conditional on the corresponding value for µt). Again, the approximation closely tracks the exact
density ft+1 in the interior, and there is no significant mass on {0, 1}.
D.3 Beliefs after no transition
Finally, consider the case of no transition. From Proposition 3, the posterior density is given by
f˜ t(ϑ) =
F ′t(ϑ)
Ft(θ¯t)
· 1− h(st)ϑ
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
,
yielding
ft+1(ϑ) =
1
Ft(θ¯t)
· 1
1− h(st)M1t (θ¯t)
∫ ∞
−∞
φµ,σ2 (ϑ− ρθ)ft(θ)(1− h(st)θ) dθ
for any interior ϑ ∈ (0, 1). The corresponding Beta approximation is given by
fapproxt+1 (ϑ) = βρµ˜t+µ,ρ2σ˜2t+σ2 (ϑ),
with µ˜t and σ˜
2
t as in (11) and (12).
Panel (c) of Figure 15 compares ft+1 with its approximation f
approx
t+1 for three different states St.
Specifically, we set µt to its 10th, 50th and 90th percentile conditional there being no transition at t
(xt = λt, ηt = 0). The values of σ
2
t and λt (needed to compute h(st)) is fixed at their associated
median (conditional on the corresponding value for µt). Again, the approximation closely tracks the
exact density ft+1 in the interior, and there is no significant mass on {0, 1}.
57
E Comparative Statics of the Generation Game
Comparative statics in λ Here we explore how an increase in the regime size λ affects the
policy mappings depicted in Figures 5 and 6. The primary implication of an increase in λ is a
reduction in potential supporters of a revolt along the extensive margin. Accordingly, absent reforms,
the regime is more stable (seen in the right panel of Figure 16), which manifests itself in a reduced
inclination to implement reforms (θ¯ is higher, see left panel of Figure 16). A second order implication
then is that for increased values for θ¯, the pooling belief θˆpool increases as well (seen in the left
panel of Figure 17), which in turn increases the off-equilibrium support for revolts conditional on
x ∈ (λ, ξ(θ¯)) as seen in the right panel of Figure 17.
0 θ¯t 1
λt
ξ(θ¯t)
1
θt
xt
Equilibrium reforms
0 θ¯t 1
1
2
θt
pt Revolt hazard
Figure 16: Effect of λ on equilibrium reforms and implied probability to be overthrown. Black lines show mappings
for λ = .1, red lines show mappings for λ = .5.
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Size of revolt
Figure 17: Effect of λ on equilibrium beliefs and implied mass of insurgents. Black lines show mappings for λ = .1,
red lines show mappings for λ = .5.
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Comparative statics in F To demonstrate the effect of outsiders’ beliefs on F on the policy
mappings, suppose F is parametrized by a Beta distribution with moments (µ, σ2). Note that the
case where F is uniform is a special of the Beta distribution where µ = .5 and σ2 = 1/12. We
compare this benchmark case, depicted in the main text with the case where µ = .35 and σ2 remains
fixed at the uniform value of 1/12. The results are shown in Figures 18 and 19. It can be seen that
the decline in outsiders’ prior expectation (seen in the left panel of Figure 19) leads again to a drop
in revolt hazard (right panels of Figures 18 and 19), which makes insiders less inclined to reform (θ¯
is higher, see left panel of Figure 18).
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0 θ¯t 1
1
2
θt
pt Revolt hazard
Figure 18: Effect of µ on equilibrium reforms and implied probability to be overthrown. Black lines show mappings
for µ = .5, red lines show mappings for µ = .35.
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Figure 19: Effect of µ on equilibrium beliefs and implied mass of insurgents. Black lines show mappings for µ = .5,
red lines show mappings for µ = .35.
59
Comparison with symmetric information case Finally, we compare the equilibrium reform
mapping with the case where outsiders fully observe θt. Full information implies strictly more
reforms by insiders compared to the asymmetric information case (see left panel of Figure 20).
This is because asymmetric information essentially imposes an extra cost on reforms associated
with revealing that the regime is of a higher type θt. On the one hand, this manifests itself in
a large pool of regimes not conducting any reform, even though reforms are optimal under full
information. On the other hand, since any marginal increase in reforms also implies a marginal
change in outsiders’ beliefs dθˆ/dx = ξ−1(x), the reform schedule itself (conditionally on conducting
reforms) is biased downwards under asymmetric information. As a consequence, revolts tend to
be less likely under symmetric information, even though the revolt hazard may point-wise exceed
the one under asymmetric information for certain values of θ.43 Integrating over realizations of θ
(using the uniform prior as probability measure), yields an average revolt hazard of under symmetric
information of 5.64 percent as opposed to 13.67 percent under asymmetric information.
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Figure 20: Equilibrium reforms and implied probability to be overthrown under symmetric information. Black lines
show equilibrium mappings with asymmetric information, red lines show mappings under full information.
43Specifically, the hazard exceeds the one under asymmetric information for θ ∈ (EF {ϑ|ϑ ≤ θ¯asym}, θ¯sym].
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